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I. INTRODUCTION 
The world is now at its climate’s “tipping point” at a precipice to 
redress global warming; after which our ability to halt a climate 
temperature rise below 2 degrees Centigrade (3.4 degrees Fahrenheit) is 
deemed unreachable.
1
 How to arrest the fast-accelerating accumulation of 
long-term carbon in the atmosphere is the legal and environmental 
challenge of the 21st century. It involves intelligent implementation of 
legal mechanisms, not technical fixes. Governments must quickly torque 
the levers of international power, but U.S. courts are finding some of these 
levers unconstitutional.  
International climate agreements have operated poorly to date: The 
1997 Kyoto Protocol concluded its operative phase in 2012, and three 
major and necessary covered world powers—Russia, Japan and New 
Zealand—then refused to agree to any subsequent obligations.2 The Paris 
COP-21 continued the two most criticized elements of the Kyoto 
 
 
 1. Dean Scott, NASA Scientist Recalls 1988 Testimony by Seeking Phaseout of Coal-Fired 
Plants, 39 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1263, 1273 (2008). 
 2. Juliet Eilperin, Kyoto Protocol Extended in Contentious U.N. Climate Talks, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 8, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/kyoto-protocol-
extended-in-contentious-un-climate-talks/2012/12/08/f64a51c0-4178-11e2-ae43-cf491b837f7b_story. 
html; See also Michael Bastasch, Only 37 Countries Willing to Back Kyoto Protocol Extension, DAILY 
CALLER, Dec. 12, 2010, available at http://dailycaller.com/2012/12/10/only-37-countries-willing-to-
back-kyoto-protocol-extension/. 
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Protocol—placing no definitive obligations for carbon reduction on any 
nation, and being totally unenforceable. If the levers of international power 
are not grasped immediately and manipulated carefully, experts, including 
the White House Science Advisor and NASA’s lead climatologist, state 
that the battle against manageable climate change is forfeited.
3
  
The International Panel on Climate Change 2014 report concludes that 
in order to maintain world warming below 2°C, there must be a 40–70% 
reduction of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) emission from 2010 levels by 
2050.
4
 Not only was a solution nowhere in place under the Kyoto 
international climate protocols, but on the contrary, world carbon 
emissions each year are increasing rapidly rather than diminishing.
5
 Global 
GHG emissions increased by an average of 2.2% per year from 2000 to 
2010, nearly double the 1.3% per year growth during the preceding 30 
years.
6
  
To address climate change in the narrow window of time before the 
battle for no increase more than 2º C is forfeited, the electric power sectors 
of the 200 world nations are the critical focus for effectively controlling 
carbon emissions.
7
 The technology exists to dramatically mitigate carbon 
emissions.
8
 However, all world nations must engage in a fundamental shift 
from the carbon-intensive methods by which electric power is produced.
9
 
The levers of (electric) power are the critical controls that much be 
manipulated and applied.  
The most used lever, internationally and in the European Union, to 
promote quick implementation of renewable power, feed-in tariffs 
(“FiTs”), has been declared fundamentally unconstitutional when 
mandated by U.S. states.
10
 When misused, states can be ordered to pay the 
 
 
 3. See infra notes 341–48. 
 4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 82 (2014), available at http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full. 
pdf. 
 5. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-151, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 48 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/283397.pdf. 
 6. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Nov. 28, 2014, 6 (2014), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers.pdf.  
 7. See infra Part II.  
 8. Andrea Vittorio, Countries Could Double Global Share of Renewable Energy by 2030, 
Agency Says, ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA), Jan. 22, 2014, at 20, 21. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra Part III.C. 
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challengers’ attorneys’ fees.11 Even though FiTs are legal in European 
Union countries at the national level, the record demonstrates flawed and 
uneconomic use of these mechanisms.
12
 The program cost imposed on 
utility rate payers has caused backlash among stakeholders and significant 
financial hemorrhage in Germany, Italy and Spain, the primary countries 
aggressively employing FiTs.
13
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”), the alternative international 
lever used by 29 U.S. states to maneuver sustainable power 
development,
14
 creates a separate tradable “virtual” credit earned by 
independent renewable energy producers, which utilities must purchase at 
a substantial price.
15
 When maneuvered in a discriminatory fashion, the 
RPS levers have resulted in successful constitutional attack on U.S. state 
RPS programs.
16
 RPS programs are now gaining popularity 
internationally;
17
 their costs, as with net metering, are imposed on utility 
customers.
18
  
FiTs, net metering, and RPS are the primary legal levers in place to 
maneuver an international transition before the critical climate “tipping 
point” is exceeded in the next few years. Each lever operates differently, 
exerts distinct economic impacts, and now confronts different legal 
barriers in different national systems of law. This Article identifies, 
compares, contrasts, and torques the levers of international power. 
Sustainable development and continuation of world civilization in the 
manner we know it depend on effective and intelligent regulatory use of 
these comparative levers of power, and creation of legal space to do so. 
Part II of this Article explores why electric power forms the critical 
crucible in which climate, policy and law now mix. Part III examines the 
legal implications of feed-in tariffs, which European and other world 
nations employ to promote renewable electric power. Comparing U.S. to 
international experience, Part III then analyzes why these same techniques 
 
 
 11. See Energy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC et. al. v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 
2012), rev’d on appeal. Similar request for fees were made after plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges 
were upheld in cases in California, New Jersey, and Maryland. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 
F.Supp.2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (field preemption and conflict 
preemption on wholesale power prices); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. 
N.J. 2013), aff’d PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (field preemption on 
wholesale power prices and rates). 
 12. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 16. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 17. See infra fig.5. 
 18. See infra notes 76, 114, 178, 181, 189, 289, 290. 
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have been held unconstitutional in the U.S. when implemented by 
California and other states. And even though legal in Europe, Part III 
examines the financial loss that has resulted from Germany’s, Italy’s, and 
Spain’s misaligned positioning of this lever of power.  
Part IV examines the alternative levers employed in the majority of 
U.S. states to promote renewable energy deployment: renewable portfolio 
standards and net metering. These are legal if carefully designed. 
However, the specific programs in several states have been found by 
federal Circuit Courts to violate the Constitution. A series of recent legal 
challenges has resulted in states having to legally remake their programs. 
Part IV also surveys where and how these levers of power are 
implemented internationally.  
Warming molecules emitted anywhere on the Earth warm the entire 
Earth universally. The international legal challenge confronting the world 
nations that attended the Paris Conference of Parties in late 2015 was to 
correctly deploy these levers of power before we exceed scientists’ 
declared “tipping point” of no known return. One size will not fit all 
nations. Part V strategically manipulates these key international levers of 
power for the developed and developing countries of the world.  
II. POWER—ALTERING THE ELECTRIC CURRENT 
A. Climate Change  
1. The Effect of Carbon 
Climate change is a significant global issue; in some ways, perhaps, the 
global issue of the 21st century at which the world of nations must either 
succeed quickly or fail. After 800,000 years of GHG levels hovering 
between 180 and 280 parts per million (ppm) in the atmosphere, GHG 
levels have now precipitously increased to 400 ppm.
19
 See infra Figure 1. 
And the earth is warming and the sea level rising.
20
  
 
 
 19. Brian Clark Howard, Northern Hemisphere Cracks 400 ppm CO₂ for Whole Month for 
First Time, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, May 27, 2014, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/ 
news/2014/05/140527-400-ppm-carbon-dioxide-global-warming-climate-science/. 
 20. Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-5-1.html. 
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FIGURE 1 
Year 
GHG annual emissions increased about 70% between 1970 and 2004, 
with the combustion of fossil fuels accounting for 70% of GHG emissions, 
the subcategory of electric power generation responsible for 40% of CO2 
emissions, and the further subcategory of coal-fired electric power 
generation accounting for about 70% of the emissions in this electric 
power sector.
21
 Global energy-related emissions are expected to increase 
57% from 2005 to 2030.
22
 At current rates of energy development, energy-
related CO2 emissions in 2050 would be 237% of their current levels under 
 
 
 21. Joëlle de Sépibus, The Liberalisation of the Power Industry in the European Union and Its 
Impact on Climate Change: A Legal Analysis of the Internal Market in Electricity 2–4, SWISS NAT’L 
CTR. OF COMPETENCE IN RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 2008/10, 2008), available at 
http://phase1.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/Brown%20Bags/de20Sepibus_EU20lib20CC--final.pdf. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 48. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/6
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the existent pattern of power development and expansion.
23
 And it is 
estimated that life as we know it would change fundamentally with the 
resultant warming.
24
 
According to a recent OECD report examining policy challenges for 
the next 50 years, unless CO2 emissions are reduced, climate change could 
curb global gross domestic product (“GDP”) by 1.5% by 2060 and by 
nearly 6% in South and Southeast Asia.
25 “The electric power sector offers 
the most cost-effective opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions,” compared 
to transportation and other sectors.
26
 The International Energy Agency 
(“IEA”) presents evidence that the $44 trillion27 in additional investment 
needed to decarbonize the energy system in line with the IEA’s “2º 
scenario” by 2050 is more than offset by over $115 trillion in fuel savings, 
resulting in net savings of $71 trillion.
28
 Economically, a successful end is 
within reach. 
The global fleet of power plants will emit an estimated 300 billion 
tons of carbon dioxide before they are retired,” with coal-fired 
plants comprising about two-thirds of this.
29
 According to a 2014 
academic study, an average of 89 gigawatts per year of coal-fired 
capacity was added annually between 2010 and 2012, up from 66 
gigawatts per year between 2000 and 2009 and 33 gigawatts per 
year between 1990 and 1999. Energy demand in fast-growing 
economies, such as China and India, is driving the projected 
emissions . . . . China alone represents 42% of projected future 
emissions . . . .
30
 
 
 
 23. Press Conference Presentation, Int’l Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives: 
Scenarios and Strategies to 2050, July 14, 2006,  available at http://www.unece.lsu.edu/biofuels/ 
documents/2007July/SRN_020.pdf; Holli Riebeek, Global Warming, NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND 
SPACE ADMIN. EARTH OBSERVATORY, June 3, 2010, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/ 
GlobalWarming/printall.php?.  
 24. Riebeek, supra note 23. 
 25. ECON. DEPT., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., POL’Y NOTE NO. 24, 25. See also SHIFTING 
GEAR: POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT 50 YEARS 8 (2014). 
 26. STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX 29 (2010). 
 27. International Energy Agency, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 
2014: HARNESSING ELECTRICITY’S POTENTIAL 14 (2014). The $44 trillion figure is “in real 2012 USD 
[United States dollars], i.e. excluding inflation”; it also includes other infrastructure beyond just 
sustainable energy. Id. at 14 n.1. 
 28. Id. at 14. “Even with a 10% discount rate, the net savings are more than USD 5 trillion.” Id. 
 29. Andrew Childers, 300 Billion Tons of Carbon Dioxide Will Be Emitted by Power Plants 
Globally, Study Says, 45 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2511, 2536, (2014) (citing Steven J. Davis & Robert H. 
Socolow, Commitment Accounting of CO2 Emissions, ENV’T RES. LETTERS, Aug. 2014, at 5, available 
at http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/9/8/084018/pdf. 
 30. Id. 
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Choices made today about the types, features and location of long-lived 
electric energy infrastructure will determine the extent and impact of 
climate change and the vulnerability or resilience of world societies to it. 
Four-fifths of the total energy-related CO2 emissions permitted to 2035 in 
the IEA “450 Scenario” are already locked in by existing capital stock, 
including power stations, buildings, and factories.
31
 Without further 
radical change and action by 2017, the energy-related infrastructure then 
in place would generate all the CO2 emissions allowed in the “450 
Scenario” up to 2035.32 
2. International Regulation  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”) is the parent treaty that generated the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol.
33
 Under the Protocol, 37 states, consisting of industrialized 
countries and the European community, have imposed GHG emission 
limitation and reduction commitments, while the remaining 155 
developing countries among the 192 signatories, including the largest 
GHG emitter among all nations, have non-binding generic general 
undertakings to constrain emissions.
34
 The Doha Amendment to extend the 
Protocol for the period 2013–2020 was not ratified, and further “soft” 
commitments embodied in the 2015 COP-21 Paris Agreement, which also 
is unenforceable.  
Under the Protocol, there are 41 designated “Annex I” countries 
(including 27 members of the European Union, plus eight other European 
Union nations in Europe including Belarus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand),
35
 which are the only 
countries subject to carbon emission reduction amounts. While all U.N. 
 
 
 31. The World Is Locking Itself into an Unsustainable Energy Future Which Would Have Far-
Reaching Consequences, IEA Warns in Its Latest World Energy Outlook, IEA, Nov. 9, 2011, available 
at https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2011/november/the-world-is-locking-itself-
into-an-unsustainable-energy-future.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 10, 
2015). 
 34. Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ 
kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2015). 
 35. List of Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php (last visited Oct. 10, 
2015). 
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members except Andorra and South Sudan are signatories, Japan, New 
Zealand, and Russia, which all participated in Kyoto’s first round through 
2012, did not agree to new targets in the current second commitment 
period.
36
 The net 37 covered Annex I countries subject to Kyoto Protocol 
carbon emission reductions represent approximately 20% of world 
countries and less than 40% of world carbon emission sources.
37
 The 
group of covered countries is responsible for the minority of emissions. 
While the Paris COP-21 2015 Agreementincluded a soft, non-quantitative 
general commitment from all countries to hold GHG emissions to a level 
to keep global warming below 2 degrees C. from historic levels, there is 
no specific commitment on any country. This could become either a new 
era of unified common world enterprise, or the classic “tragedy of the 
commons.” 
The European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (“EU-
ETS”) is a continental emission limitation rubric that includes 85% of the 
subset of countries subject to binding regulation on carbon emissions 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU-ETS was implemented in 2005 as a 
parallel CO2 regulatory system with an earlier start for the now 27 EU-
member countries and three other participating European countries 
(Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) that also are covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol.
38
 The EU-ETS covers CO2 emissions at approximately 5,000 
companies at 12,000 industrial sites, unlike the Kyoto Protocol which 
covers all GHGs.
39
  
Starting in 2013 in the E.U., a renewable energy portfolio requirement 
(like the U.S. RPS discussed infra) mandates each country to achieve a 
certain percentage of renewable power production and use in future years. 
The EU-ETS provides different target percentages for different countries, 
placing less pressure on those countries that had not previously promoted 
 
 
 36. Eilperin, supra note 2. 
 37. See GHG Data, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, available at 
http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php. There are 196 recognized countries in the 
world. See Matt Rosenberg, The Number of Countries in the World, ABOUT.COM, 
http://geography.about.com/cs/countries/a/numbercountries.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2015). Taiwan, 
Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Greenland, Palestine, and the Western Sahara are not recognized as 
independent countries. Id. If these were recognized, they would bring the total number of countries to 
more than 200. 
 38. The EU-ETS entered into force on 25 October 2003. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 32, 2003 
O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:32003L0087&qid=1444433038489&from=EN [hereinafter “Council Directive 2003/87”]. 
 39. Compare The Emission Trading Scheme, OURCLIMATE.EU, http://www.ourclimate.eu/ 
ourclimate/ourclimate/euets.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2015), with Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, Dec. 10, 1997, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
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renewable power measures.
40
 To cut GHG emissions, countries are 
moving to more deployment of renewable energy. 
B. Changes in Renewable Technology and Economics 
There is a big change in the economics of wind and solar photovoltaic 
(“PV”) distributed generation. “PV module prices have experienced a . . . 
decline from ~$1.90 [per] watt in 2009 to $0.70 [per] watt (and below in 
some regions of the world) . . . .”41 Since 2008, the price of PV panels has 
fallen by 75%, and solar installations have multiplied by 1,000%.
42
 See 
infra Figure 2. Inverter prices, for the equipment necessary to convert PV 
direct current power to alternating current power used in world nations, 
have also declined by more than 60% in cost from $0.60 to $1.00 or more 
per watt in 2005 to under $0.20 per watt in 2013.
43
  
 
 
 40. Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual, ¶¶ 18, 28, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf. 
 41. RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH. DEPLOYMENT, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, RESIDENTIAL 
PROSUMERS—DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS (RE-PROSUMERS) 9 (2014), available at http://iea-
retd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/RE-PROSUMERS_IEA-RETD_2014.pdf (citing Jade Jones, 
Regional PV Module Pricing Dynamics: What You Need to Know, GREENTECH MEDIA, Nov. 22, 2013, 
available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/regional-pv-module-pricing-dynamics-
what-you-need-to-know. 
 42. Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares over U.S. Utility Bills, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 24, 2013, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/12/ 
131226-utilities-dispute-net-metering-for-solar/.  
 43. Id.; RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH. DEPLOYMENT, supra note 41 (citing id.; Ian Clover, IHS 
Cuts Global Inverter Market Forecast in Face of Dramatic Price Drops, PV MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 
2013, available at http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/ihs-cuts-global-inverter-market-
forecast-in-face-of-dramatic-price-drops_100013052/#axzz3o7isum1t. 
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FIGURE 2  
This has allowed the solar PV markets to grow at an average rate of 
“more than 40% each year since 2000.”44 See infra Figure 3. The costs of 
renewable energy have declined significantly in recent years.
45
 One 
additional rooftop solar system was installed every four minutes in 2013 in 
the United States.
46
   
 
 
 44. RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH. DEPLOYMENT, supra note 41, at 10. 
 45. Ronald Lehr, New Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models for the New Era, 
35 ELEC. J. 40 (Oct. 2013).  
 46. Than, supra note 42. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Even with prices falling dramatically, the amount of usable power that 
one can get out of a PV unit is also a function of latitude. Solar insolation 
ranges from 2.0–2.5 kWh/m2/day in Scandinavia to as much as 6.5–7.0 
kWh/m2/day in north-central Africa.
47
 “Countries could meet or exceed a 
United Nations goal to double the global share of hydropower, wind 
power and other forms of renewable energy by 2030 at almost no 
additional cost . . . .” according to a report from an intergovernmental 
organization promoting renewable energy.
48
 “The technology needed to 
meet the goal already exists, but targeted action by the public and private 
sector is necessary to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy 
across the buildings, transport, industry, and electricity sectors, the 
International Renewable Energy Agency [Remap 2030] report sa[ys].”49 
Studies of technical potential have found that rooftop PV could supply 20–
 
 
 47. RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH. DEPLOYMENT, supra note 41, at 27. A 1 kW PV system in 
Namibia achieves a capacity factor of ~23% and produces about 2,000 kWh per year, while a similar 
size system in Scandinavia operates at a capacity factor half this value and produces half as much 
power output. Id. 
 48. Vittorio, supra note 8 (citing INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, REMAP 2030: A 
RENEWABLE ENERGY ROADMAP 17 (2014), available at http://www.irena.org/remap/REmap%20 
Summary%20final_webdisplay%20no%20links.pdf). 
 49. Id. at 49. Vittorio, supra note 8. 
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40% (or more) of total national electricity demand in Europe and the 
United States.
50
  
C. Renewable Power Transition, Benefits 
The historic use of different energy sources over the past four centuries 
is illustrated in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4 
Before use of large-scale steam turbines, energy requirements in the 
U.S. were met through on-site generation.
51
 The dominant fuel was wood 
for most of the past 400 years, a renewable energy source. A Ceres report 
forecasts reducing greenhouse gas emissions by up to 80% while placing 
less emphasis on fossil fuel generation of electricity.
52
  
 
 
 50. RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH. DEPLOYMENT, supra note 41, at 35. See also Maya Chaudhari, 
Lisa Frantzis, & Tom E. Hoff, PV Grid Connected Market Potential under a Cost Breakthrough 
Scenario, THE ENERGY FOUNDATION (2004), available at http://esc.fsu.edu/documents/lectures/ 
SP07/EF-Final-Final2.pdf; PHOTOVOLTAIC POWER SYSTEMS PROGRAMME, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 
REPORT IEA-PVPS T7-4: 2002 (SUMMARY), POTENTIAL FOR BUILDING INTEGRATED PHOTOVOLTAICS 
8 (2002), available at http://proclimweb.scnat.ch/portal/ressources/2418.pdf; See generally 
GREENPEACE & THE EUROPEAN PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, SOLAR GENERATION 6: 
SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC ELECTRICITY EMPOWERING THE WORLD (2011), available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2011/Final%20Sola
rGeneration%20VI%20full%20report%20lr.pdf. 
 51. U.S. Dept. of Energy study, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND 
RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION, at i (2007).  
 52. Forrest Small & Lisa Frantzis, The 21st Century Electric Utility: Positioning for a Low-
Carbon Future, CERES (July 2010), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/the-21st-
century-electric-utility-positioning-for-a-low-carbon-future-1.  
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Distributed power generation creates benefits for the larger energy 
system: Generating power onsite avoids energy loss of the transmission 
and distribution and can defer costs of distribution and transmission 
capacity upgrade modifications.
53
 With more centralized large-scale 
power, centralized power sources require their electricity to be transported 
long distances to reach end-users, during which transit 7–10% of the 
electricity is lost as waste heat.
54
 An on-site distributed generation system 
does not encounter these losses because the electricity travels a short 
distance, unless it is exported to the grid.
55
 
Distributed generation from renewable energy sources benefits the 
environment by reducing carbon emissions. Distributed generation 
provides reliability to consumers
56
 by diversifying the sources that supply 
electricity.
57
 Blackouts and brownouts of power supply to individual 
consumers can be prevented by distributing power sources on-site 
throughout the grid.
58
 Even in the absence of a loss of centralized power 
distribution, distributed generation systems can provide supplemental or 
back-up power to supplement power reliability and redundancy to critical-
use customers, such as data centers and hospitals.
59
  
 Additional deployment of renewable energy resources can have 
measureable significant positive public externalities: 
 Increasing power system reliability with more independent 
points of generation
60
 
 Creating a reliable and appropriately more-mixed generation 
supply diversity for the electric power system
61
 
 Putting less pressure on the use of the aging power 
distribution system by utilizing on-site private power rather 
 
 
 53. Id. at 44. Most countries in North America and Europe experience T&D losses of 4–8%. Id. 
 54. Frederick R. Fucci, Distributed Generation, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY 
AND RENEWABLES 345, 345 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).  
 55. See Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta of Energy 
Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower Ratepayers, 22 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 3 (2011). 
 56. Fucci, supra note 54, at 347. Reliability is a measure of the grid’s ability to meet consumers’ 
demand for electricity. DEPT. OF ENERGY STUDY, supra note 51, at 2-1. 
 57. DEPT. OF ENERGY STUDY, supra note 51, at 2-4. 
 58. Solar Electric Power Association (SEPA), Ratemaking, Solar Value and Solar Net Energy 
Metering—A Primer, at 28 (2013). Distributed generation systems support localized electricity demand 
and thereby reduce the stress on the distribution grid. DEPT. OF ENERGY STUDY, supra note 51, at 2-5. 
 59. DEPT. OF ENERGY STUDY, supra note 51, at iii. 
 60. See Distributed Energy Basics, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/ 
learning/eds_distributed_energy.html (last updated Dec. 3, 2012). 
 61.  Id. 
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than moving more power through the regulated power 
distribution system
62
 
 Using solar PV systems that can add on-peak value to the 
power transmission network with which they interconnect by 
providing supply to proximately located end users.
63
  
Some have estimated that the value of distributed solar PV units that sell 
power back to the grid results in savings to the utility system due to not 
purchasing that amount of power elsewhere, saving use of transmission 
and distribution capacity, eliminating risk of changes in fossil fuel prices, 
and saving transmission and distribution losses of 5–10%—which they 
valued cumulatively at between $0.09 and $0.25 per Kwh.
64
 In addition to 
these values to the utility system, articles note that there are other societal 
benefits in environmental and health improvements, jobs, and grid 
security, which increase the cumulative total by approximately 50%.
65
  
Self-generation of power, even if not economically based on generation 
costs alone compared to larger facilities (smaller fossil-fired units typically 
have greater environmental impacts per Kwh generated) achieves double 
avoidances of regulatory costs: 
 The generator avoids all transmission, distribution, system 
benefit charge, and tax costs in the retail bill for the amount 
generated, which avoided fractions collectively typically 
constitute more than half of the retail bill 
 The generator can receive a suite of cross-subsidies in the 
form of RECs, net metering credit value, system benefit 
charges, carbon credits; in Massachusetts, as one example, 
these state credits are collectively worth up to 1000% more 
than the value of power produced itself 
 
 
 62. See Benefits of Solar, STATES ADVANCING SOLAR, http://www.statesadvancingsolar.org/ 
solar-101/benefits-of-solar (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
 63. Edward Kahn, Avoidable Transmission Cost Is a Substantial Benefit of Solar PV, 21 ELEC. J. 
41, 45 (2008). 
 64. Richard Perez et al., Solar Power Generation in the U.S.: Too Expensive, or a Bargain?, 39 
ENERGY POL’Y 7290, 7294 (2011). The range of value that this Article attaches to wholesale power is 
significantly above the average weighted price of wholesale power transactions in the last several 
years and uses the distributed power value in New York City, a location that is capacity constrained. 
See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SERIES) vol. 2, § 10:144 
n.29 (Reuters-Thomson West 2015). 
 65. Perez et al., supra note 64, at 7293. 
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When combined with power sale revenues, the total value of solar PV 
benefits has been estimated to be higher than the levelized cost to install 
PV (e.g. $0.15–$0.41/kWh in the U.S.).66  
If that is true, PV system owners actually cross-subsidize other 
ratepayers.
67
 As with any significant social change involving critical 
infrastructure, there will be winners and losers. And it is the role of 
government to manage this change, and examine the equities and the cost-
justification of that change. And with utilities, as the last of the regulated 
industries,
68
 there is an ability to manage this change. Let’s examine one 
of the primary regulatory agents of this fundamental infrastructure change. 
III. FITS: RENEWABLE ENERGY REGULATORY PRICE MECHANISMS IN 
DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS  
A. The Fit Mechanism 
FiTs, net metering, and RPS,
69
 in that order, are three mechanisms most 
used by the international community to promote a transition from GHG-
emitting fossil-fired power technologies to sustainable energy 
technologies, as illustrated in Figure 5. Most recently, the dominant use of 
FiTs is declining while net metering and RPS use is increasing 
internationally. Neither net metering nor RPS is legally the sale of the 
power itself, as a feed-in tariff is. RPS is a state bonus credit for the 
production apart from the sale of the power itself, and net metering 
characterizes the renewable power as “banked” in a credit rather than sold, 
even though the power can be neither saved nor physically banked.  
 
 
 66. Richard Perez, Ken Zweibel & Thomas E. Hoff, Solar Power Generation in the Us: Too 
Expensive, or a Bargain?, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7290–97, 2011; Lena Hansen & Virginia Lacy, A Review 
of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies, ELEC. INNOVATION LAB (2013). 
 67. Id. at 43; Lori Bird et al., Regulatory Considerations Associated with the Expanded Adoption 
of Distributed Solar, NREL (Nov. 2013), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60613.pdf.  
 68. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 582 (Wolters Kluwer Aspen, 6th ed. 2013). 
 69. For a discussion of RPS, see STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10.109 
(Reuters-Thomson West, 37th ed. 2015); Steven Ferrey, Chad Laurent & Cameron Ferrey, Fire and 
Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 
DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y J. 125, 144–58 (2010). 
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FIGURE 5: COUNTRIES WITH RENEWABLE POLICIES BY TYPE—2010–2014 
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The number of feed-in tariffs has expanded dramatically during the 
past several years from just a few policies concentrated primarily in 
Europe in the 2000s (see Figure 6) to over 60 FIT policies in jurisdictions 
around the world (See Figure 7).
70
 As of 2013, the majority of feed-in 
tariffs are now concentrated in developing countries.
71
 
FIGURE 6 
  
 
 
 70. RENEWABLES 2013 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT, REN 21, 116 (2013), available at 
http://www.ren21.net/portals/0/documents/resources/gsr/2013/gsr2013_lowres.pdf. 
 71. Id. 
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FIGURE 7 
A feed-in tariff is a regulatory requirement imposed by some nations or 
states on their regulated utilities to purchase on a wholesale basis certain 
designated types of independent power generation, typically from 
renewable resources or combined heat and power (“CHP”) units, at prices 
well in excess of the market value of that wholesale power.
72
 The 
regulated utilities are forced to “buy high” in terms of other electric power 
available in the market.
73
 FiTs administratively torque the economics of 
the operating power market in favor of the sellers of certain government-
designated renewable or CHP power, not adhering to accepted rate-making 
precedent to minimize prudent utility-incurred costs.
74
 Costs of a FiT are 
passed on to captive consumers by the utilities.
75
 FiTs are successful in 
encouraging development of new wind and solar renewable energy 
facilities, as illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
 
 72. STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:134 (Reuters-Thomson West, 37th 
ed. 2015). 
 73. Electric power in the Northeast has been available at an average price during the past years of 
$0.05/Kwh or less. See generally Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Dec. 6, 2013, 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf (providing the annual statistics for each state’s 
average cost to the ultimate consumer for electric power). The Vermont FiTs for power of this value 
were set for wind of < 15 kW at $0.20/kWh, for wind > 15 kW at $0.125/kWh, and for solar 
generation at $0.30/kWh. Id. 
 74. STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 5:9 (Reuters-Thomson West, 37th ed. 
2015). 
 75. Id. § 10:134. 
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FIGURE 8
76
 
 
B. Internationally 
1. German and Spain FiTs cause Fits 
Europe is the progenitor of the FiT, with Germany and Spain the 
leading countries in using FiTs to achieve solar photovoltaic development 
and wind project development.
77
 Spain encouraged dramatic amounts of 
wind power and photovoltaic power.
78
 Its FiT was successful in quickly 
mobilizing significant and dramatic increases in the use of renewable 
energy: from less than 1% of total energy supply in Spain in 1990 to 
24.7% in 2009, and 54% in 2013,
79
 overrunning the national target for of 
400 Mw of photovoltaic production by 1000% by 2011.
80
 The German 
FiTs were an extremely effective means to a renewable power end, rising 
from 3.4% renewable generation in Germany in 1990 to 23.5% in 2012.
81
 
 
 
 76. IEA, PROSUMER, supra note 41. 
 77. Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 940 
(2014). 
 78. Id. at 980. 
 79. Id. at 979. 
 80. Id. at 980. 
 81. Id. at 960. 
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However, the cost at which these benefits were purchased was 
unsustainable. This “success” on attracting new entrants would be true of 
any program where financial windfalls are given away to participants. The 
above-market cost of these FiTs is passed on to ratepayers as €6.24 
cents/Kwh Umlage or upcharge in 2014 at a value of €20 billion annually, 
which has caused German retail utility rates to almost double for all 
consumers since 2000.
82
 When Spain abrogated FiT contracts, litigation 
charging a retroactive application of unconstitutional law resulted.
83
 
2. Cost Implications 
One commenter has noted that “many advocates of alternative energy 
. . . heap acclaim on feed-in tariffs, with one observer declaring them 
simply ‘fabulous.’”84 “The line of scholars, analysts, and advocates 
rushing to say that feed-in tariffs are better [than other mechanisms] is not 
a short one.”85 However, FiTs have not been seamless, in practice. 
Problems associated with FiTs have been:
86
 
 The long-term expense of FiTs 
 Windfall profits realized by project developers 
 Inequity between well-off citizens compared to lower-income 
citizens 
In the leading countries, the cost of FiTs has exceeded expectations. In 
Germany, starting in 1990, the FiT morphed from a modestly designed 
program for PV power paying €8.52cents/Kwh, into a program by 2000 
paying €50.62 cents/Kwh for a twenty-year period of delivery of 
renewable power.
87
 These rates were deemed to be excessive and did not 
employ any competitive market process to select the tariff rate.
88
 
Nonetheless, the price for German PV power in 2004 was increased to 
€57.4 cents/Kwh.89 
Because of concern about excessive payments to renewable energy 
project under the FiT, in 2009, the PV rate was lowered to €43.01 
 
 
 82. Id. at 962. 
 83. Id. at 979 
 84. Id. at 939. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 940. 
 87. Id. at 948–49. 
 88. Id. at 950. 
 89. Id. at 952. 
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cents/Kwh, and additional retractions for future projects occurred in 
2010,
90
 and by 2011 the rate for rooftop solar was reduced to €28.74 
cents/Kwh.
91
 By 2012, it had been reduced for PV power to €13.5 
cents/Kwh for future eligible renewable energy facilities.
92
 
Consequences result for utility customers. Household electricity prices 
are as much as four times higher in Germany as in the U.S.
93
 The world’s 
fourth-largest economy, Germany, has experienced average electricity 
prices for companies jumping 60% over the past five years because of 
costs passed along as part of government subsidies of renewable energy 
producers passed on to rate payers; prices are now more than double those 
than anywhere in the U.S.
94
 The primary beneficiaries of the German 
Energiewende are investors in wind and solar installations.  
Although the wholesale spot market price for energy in Germany for a 
kilowatt-hour of electricity is €3.2 cents/Kwh, even now under the 
drastically reduced average guaranteed price for renewable wholesale 
power by the German government is €17 cents/Kwh, 500% the real value 
of the wholesale power.
95
 German utilities recently increased the surcharge 
levied on consumers to fund more renewables by 18% to €6.24cents per 
Kwh. German households now have the third-highest power bills in 
Europe.
96
 The renewable energy surcharge to subsidize distributed power 
levied on German households and businesses has nearly tripled in four 
years since 2010 and now accounts for about 18% of a German 
household’s total electric bill, or approximately €24 billion a year.97 
Certain large trade-sensitive industries are exempt from the charge, which 
saves about €5 billion annually for them by shifting that amount of 
expenses to other German electricity rate payers.
98
  
 
 
 90. Id. at 955–56. 
 91. Id. at 958. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Than, supra note 43.  
 94. Matthew Karnitschnig, Germany’s Expensive Gamble on Renewable Energy, WALL STREET 
J., Aug. 26, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/germanys-expensive-gamble-on-
renewable-energy-1409106602. About 35% of Europe’s electricity is projected to come from 
renewable sources by 2020, while Germany has goals of 40%–45% of its electricity from renewable 
sources, rising to at least 80% by 2050. Id. 
 95. The German FIT rate for residential generators is currently €0.131/kWh; the average retail 
electricity rate in Germany is ~€0.29/kWh.  
 96. Rob Wile, Europe’s Renewable Energy Push Has Completely Backfired, And Electricity Bills 
Are Skyrocketing, Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/europes-soaring-energy-prices-2013-
11#ixzz374NkncXq. 
 97. Id. Almost 75% of Germany’s small- and medium-size industrial businesses say rising 
energy costs are a major risk, according to a recent survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 
Federation of German Industry. 
 98. Id. About 2,000 of Germany’s heavy industrial users are exempt from paying the surcharge 
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Spain fared even worse. Spain was the second largest generator of 
renewable energy in Europe by virtue of its FiT.
99
 The FiT started in 1980 
at €36 cents/Kwh for small solar projects,100 rose to €36 cents/Kwh in 
1994,
101
 and in 2004 had increased to 575% more than the average price of 
electricity.
102
 The projects were guaranteed these payments for up to 40 
years.
103
 The Japanese FIT also is a high value.
104
  
The high FITs provided and their costs to the utility system were 
unsustainable during the recession, and rates were reduced in 2008.
105
 
Spain reneged on contracts and reconfigured its FiT; the rate was slashed 
to €13/Kwh.106 In 2010, with a tariff debt from the FiT program of €26 
billion, contracts were abrogated by the utility, rates reduced, and the 
number of hours that the rate applied were reduced post facto.
107
 
Unsuccessful litigation resulted, charging that the changes were illegally 
retroactive; the European Commission criticized Spain’s radical change in 
policy as a threat to foreign investment in the E.U.
108
 Additional radical 
cuts and abrogation of existing contracts occurred in 2013.
109
  
In Spain, the cost of FiTs was a dramatic expense to the utility, at the 
same time that Spanish utilities were limited to increase retail utility prices 
no more than 2% annually.
110
 With utilities forced to “buy high” at FiT 
rates, and “sell low” at constrained retail rates, it was a prescription for 
disaster. The government was forced to guarantee the utilities’ securitized 
debts largely resulting from the FiT expenses.
111
 In Spain, the government 
has not yet determined how it will pay for the accrued €26 billion debt 
related to its cross-subsidies of certain renewable distributed generation.
112
 
“Ultimately consumers and taxpayers will have to shoulder the cost, 
 
 
until at least 2017. The E.U. proposes to scrutinize whether the exemption is an unfair trade support. 
 99. Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 967 
(2014). 
 100. Id. at 968–69. 
 101. Id. at 969. 
 102. Id. 973–74. 
 103. Id. at 976. 
 104. The FIT in Japan for systems below 10 kW is ¥36.0 (US$0.35); the average residential rate in 
Japan is under $0.30/kWh.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. n.296. 
 107. Id. at 976–77. 
 108. Id. n.254. 
 109. Id. at 979. 
 110. Id. at 981. 
 111. Id. n.288. 
 112. Andrés Cala, Renewable Energy in Spain Is Taking a Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/business/energy-environment/renewable-energy-in-spain-is-
taking-a-beating.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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through power bills or government budgets. . . . Around 55,000 families 
have mortgaged their life savings and assets to invest in small solar farms 
in the countryside—with the guarantee of government-backed returns.”113  
 Neither the Spanish or German FiT programs utilized market forces to 
determine an accurate, or competitively determined, tariff for renewable 
wholesale power that the utilities were compelled to purchase. Now, both 
countries are attempting to force existing renewable energy projects into 
market-tethered tariffs rather than their originally-promised 
administratively determined tariffs.
114
 Between 2009 and 2012, Germany 
and Spain made yearly retractions and retrenchments in their FiT policies 
to attempt to discourage the robust renewable power adoption that they 
were designed to cause, to contain fast-spiraling costs, and each year each 
country’s officials were so off the mark that their actions only accelerated 
costs and the depth of obligation.
115
  
The German FiT changes were prospective and did not disturb existing 
renewable energy contracts and commitments; Spain made its changes 
retroactive to existing commitments, violating what many countries 
consider fundamental legal principles to not interfere with prior contracts. 
Each of these retrenchments can be viewed as either a necessary 
modification when massive cost overruns were evident, or testament to the 
inability of each to achieve a cost-effective transition to renewable energy. 
German FiTs now fluctuate monthly.
116
 This evidenced the inability of 
regulators in two of the most sophisticated and successful countries to 
accurately set the correct tariff or effectively utilize market tools to 
mitigate other administrative errors.  
There are external costs associated with integration of renewable power 
in Germany and Spain. The requirement in Germany to move new 
amounts of solar and wind power resulted in additional socialized costs 
imposed on all ratepayers more than 1000 times greater in 2012 compared 
to 2008 for grid modification, with additional projections of an additional 
€10 -42.5 billion required in the next 15 years for additional grid 
expansion to accommodate movement of power from growing distributed 
generation.
117
 The German press labelled the German FiT program 
 
 
 113. Id. Often, their loans have been underwritten by relatives and friends who can also be at risk 
for the debt. Banks could end up repossessing worthless assets and properties, in an already depressed 
Spanish economy. 
 114. Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 1001 
(2014). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 965. 
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“reckless,” a “disaster,” and a “defective . . . game plan.”118 Subsidies have 
recently been cut in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.
119
  
C. U.S. FiTs 
1. Constitutionality 
In the U.S. electric power system, the costs of state wholesale power 
generation incentives are not incurred by the utilities, but ultimately are 
passed on to its customer rate-payers, often through pre-approved 
adjustment clauses.
120
 FiTs are unconstitutional when employed by any of 
the 47 electrically interconnected continental U.S. states. The Federal 
Power Act § 205-6
121
 empower FERC exclusively to regulate rates for the 
interstate and wholesale sale and transmission of electricity.
122
 FERC case 
law exerts exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy 
in interstate commerce,” over the “sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce,” and over “all facilities for such transmission or sale 
of electric energy.”123  
 
 
 118. Id.  
 119. Steve Goreham, Lessons from Europe: Recipe for a High-Cost Energy System, 
COMMUNITIES DIGITAL NEWS, May 26, 2015, available at http://www.commdiginews.com/business-
2/economic-politics/lessons-from-europe-recipe-for-a-high-cost-energy-system-42285/#J4cCDwfZY4 
RoXb6x.99. 
 120. For more on automatic adjustment clauses used in rate making, see Frank Graves et al., 
Electric Utility Automatic Adjustment Clauses: Benefits and Design Considerations, EDISON ELEC. 
INST., Nov. 2006, available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/ 
adjustment_clauses.pdf.  
 121. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e. (2006). 
 122. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 
of Snohomish Cnty. Wash., 554 U.S. 527 (2008).  
 123. 16 U.S.C. §USC 4(b); See, e.g., Pa. Power & Light Co., 23 FERC P 61006, at 61018, reh’g 
denied, 23 FERC P 61325 (1983); S. Co. Serv. Inc., 37 FERC P 61256, at 61652 (1986); Fla. Power & 
Light Co., 40 FERC P 61045, at 61120-21, reh’g denied, 41 FERC P 61153, at 61382 (1987); Houlton 
Water Co. v. Me. Pub. Serv. Co., 60 FERC P 61141, at 61515 (1992); N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 66 
FERC P 61213, at 61488 (1994); Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC P 61012, at 61030, reconsid. 
denied, 71 FERC P 61035 (1995); Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 84 FERC P 61194, at 61973-75 (1998); 
Progress Energy, Inc., 97 FERC P 61141, at 61628 (2001); Armstrong Energy P’ship Ltd., LLP, 99 
FERC P 61024, at 61104 (2002); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 100 FERC P 61019, at p. 17 (2002); 
Barton Vill. Inc. v. Citizens Util. Co., 100 FERC P 61244, at 12 (2002); Va. Elec. & Power Co., 103 
FERC P 61109, at 6 (2003); Southern California Edison Co., 106 FERC P 61183, at 14, 19 (2004); 
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 106 FERC P 61337, at p. 14 and n.17 (2004); 
Entergy Serv. Inc., 120 FERC P 61020, at (2007); Aquila Merch. Serv, Inc., 125 FERC P 61175, at 17 
(2008). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress meant to draw a 
“bright line,” easily ascertained and not requiring case-by-case analysis, 
between state and federal jurisdiction.
124
 When a transaction is subject to 
exclusive federal FERC jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation is 
preempted as a matter of federal law and the U.S. Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, according to a long-standing and consistent line of 
rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court.
125
 The rates, terms, and provisions of 
any wholesale sale or transmission of electricity in interstate commerce are 
exclusively within federal jurisdiction and control, not state authority, 
under the Federal Power Act, according to U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.
126
 “FERC has exclusive authority to set and to determine the 
reasonableness of wholesale rates.”127 The Federal Power Act defines 
“sale at wholesale” as any sale to any person for resale.128  
The Congress in the Federal Power Act “adopt[ed] the test developed 
in the Attleboro line [of cases] which denied state power to regulate a sale 
‘at wholesale to local distributing companies’ and allowed state regulation 
of a sale at ‘local retail rates to ultimate consumers.’”129 Wholesale rates 
for sales in interstate commerce are wholly beyond any state authority.
130
 
If states impose a rate in excess of avoided cost by either “law or policy,” 
with avoided cost being the only wholesale power sale rate that states can 
set as delegates of federal authority, the “contracts will be considered to be 
void ab initio.”131 The rates, terms, and provisions of any wholesale sale, 
or transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, are exclusively 
within federal jurisdiction and control, not state authority, pursuant to the 
 
 
 124. Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
 125. New Eng. Power Co. v. N.H., 455 U.S. 331 (1982). The Supreme Court overturned an order 
of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission which restrained within the state, for the financial 
advantage of in-state ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced within the state: “Our cases 
consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution precludes a state from mandating 
that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources 
located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom.” Id. at 338. See also Mont.—Dakota 
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 
476 U.S. 953 (1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Entergy 
La. Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003). 
 126. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340. 
 127. Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371 (“FERC has exclusive authority to determine the 
reasonableness of wholesale rates.”); accord Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash., 471 
F.3d 1066, aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., 554 U.S. at 527.  
 128. Federal Power Act § 201(d), 16 U.S.C. § 824d) (“‘sale of electric energy at wholesale’ . . . 
means a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.”). 
 129. Fed. Power Comm’n, 376 U.S. at 214.  
 130. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Order on Petitions for Enforcement Action Pursuant to Section 210(h) of PURPA, S. Cal. Edison Co., 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 70 FERC P 61215 (1995).  
 131. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC P at 61029-30.  
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Federal Power Act:
132
 “FERC has exclusive authority to determine the 
reasonableness of wholesale rates.” 133  
There has been litigation in numerous states, including New Jersey, 
Maryland, Minnesota and Vermont regarding the “bright line” between 
state and federal electric power regulation:
134
 
 A successful constitutional challenge upheld by the 3rd Circuit 
in 2013 to New Jersey’s in-state energy facility preferences135 
 
 
 132. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340. 
 133. Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 371; accord Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. 
Wash., 471 F.3d 1066, aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., 554 
U.S. at 527.  
 134. For an article concluding that the Maryland RPS program and others that similarly facially 
discriminate against interstate commerce are likely unconstitutional in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, see Anne Havemann, Comment, Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland 
Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 851 
(2012). Rader and Hempling argued that courts will not apply strict scrutiny to an RPS that bases 
eligibility on a generator’s ability to produce benefits for a state rather than the geographic origin of 
the electricity. See Nancy Rader & Scott Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: A Practical 
Guide, NAT’L ASS’N of REGULATORY UTILITY COMM’N (last visited Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.naruc. 
org/Publications/rps.pdf. Recent court decisions, however, do not support that argument: stating a 
basis in the statute other than what a court determines to be the actual purpose or effect of a statute 
does not allow a state to avoid facial discrimination, strict scrutiny, or a finding of a violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992) 
(“In assessing the impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we have refused to rely solely on the 
legislature’s professed purpose and have looked as well to the effects of the law.”); Entergy Nuclear 
Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 393 (2d Cir. 2013); Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. 
Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 135. See PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D. N.J. 2013), aff’d., PPL 
Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241(3d Cir. 2014) (finding the New Jersey regulation a 
violation of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause). In 2011, New Jersey enacted legislation to 
encourage the acquisition by utilities of the output of 2000 Mw of new in-state power projects. See 
Mary Powers, PJM Generators File Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from NJ In-State Generation 
Law, ELEC. UTIL. WK., Feb. 7, 2011, at 11. New Jersey faced a pending lawsuit by several existing 
independent power generators asserting that the state law was in violation of the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause—because it was predicated on in-state “favoritism” and was a “blatant and explicit 
effort to promote the construction of new generation facilities in New Jersey”—and alleging 
discrimination in the statute’s ordering utilities to sign long-term contracts only with in-state 
generation facilities participating in multistate PJM ISO capacity. See Hannah Northey, Utilities 
Challenge N.J. Law While Preparing to Reap Its Benefits, ENVTL. & ENERGY PUBL’N, Mar. 2, 2011, 
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/03/02/4. In response, in 2011, FERC amended the PJM 
ISO rules to prevent New Jersey state law from attempting to encourage construction of in-state power 
generation by, in part, causing New Jersey to bid power into the PJM system at suppressed prices in 
order to win capacity right auctions. See Mary Powers, Rebuffed by FERC Ruling, New Jersey BPU 
Plans to Look Again at How to Attract New Generation, ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 23, 2011, at 4, 6 
(noting that FERC, on April 12, 2011, eliminated a PJM rule that allowed a prior exemption for 
projects to make minimum offer prices when tempered by state energy programs). 
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 A successful constitutional challenge upheld by the 4th Circuit 
in 2013 to Maryland’s in-state energy facility preferences, now 
pending on appeal before the Supreme Court
136
 
 A successful challenge upheld by the 2nd Circuit in 2013 to 
Vermont’s alleged attempt to discriminate against interstate 
power options for an in-state generation facility
137
 
2. FITs in California 
Despite a series of lawsuits and articles in both the technical and trade 
press,
138
 advocates for renewable power are still urging states to adopt 
FiTs in the U.S, even though courts have determined that they are 
unconstitutional when adopted at the state level in the U.S.:  
“Feed-in tariffs are the alternative to net-metering and their time has 
come. FITs have been likened to PURPA on steroids and they are as 
American as apple pie. It was a crude feed-in tariff that launched 
renewable energy in California during the early 1980s. In that 
program, you could connect your biomass, wind, or solar plant to 
 
 
 136. See PPL Energyplus, LLC et al. v. Nazarian, 974 F.Supp.2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d, PPL 
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazaria, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding the Maryland regulation a violation 
of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause); PPL Energyplus, LLC et al. v. Hughes, __ U.S. __ (argued 
and pending 2016) 
 137. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 236 (D. Vt. 2012) 
(reasoning that “states are ‘without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being 
shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands 
or because they are needed by the people of the State’” and holding that the state’s regulation in 
question was a “‘protectionist regulation’ violating the Commerce Clause” (quoting New Eng. Power 
Co., 455 U.S. at 338‒39 (1982))), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. 
Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). The trial court found the regulation unconstitutional and issued 
an injunction “enjoin[ing] Defendants from conditioning Vermont Yankee’s continued operation on 
the existence of a below-market PPA with Vermont utilities.” Id. at 239. The Second Circuit did not 
disagree with the substantive decision on the dormant Commerce Clause but procedurally held that 
this issue was not yet ripe for review until plaintiffs actually entered into such a forced PPA with the 
state. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, 733 F.3d at 433–34. 
 138. See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: State Programs on Global Warming and the 
Constitution, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2008); Steven Ferrey, et al.,, Fire and Ice: World Renewable 
Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers, 20 DUKE ENVTL L. & 
POL’Y 125 (2010); Brian Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas “Leakage”: How California Can Evade 
the Impending Constitutional Attacks, 19 ELEC. J. 43, 44 (2006) (“because of these two constitutional 
issues, courts are likely to strike down many or all of their proposals”); Steven Ferrey et al., FiT in the 
U.S.A.,” 148 NO.6 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 60 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal 
Preemption and Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47 (1991); Steven Ferrey, Follow the 
Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2012). 
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the grid, get paid a fixed-price for ten years, and then get paid a 
floating price for another twenty. And it worked—spectacularly.”139 
What is not mentioned in promotional materials and articles is that the 
federal courts and FERC separately struck down such FiTs in California 
before those 20 years were up.
140
 And having been legally reprimanded by 
both the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and FERC in the mid-1990s,
141
 
California tried again to reinstitute a FiT regulatory action fifteen years 
later. After California enacted a feed-in-tariff requiring state utilities to 
make wholesale power purchases at well in excess of wholesale rates for 
power and in excess of avoided costs, there was a challenge at the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission as to whether this violated the Federal 
Power Act and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
California argued that its environmental purpose for regulation should 
make it exempt from preemption in setting above-market wholesale feed-
in renewable tariff rates for cogeneration facilities of less than 20 Mw and 
that environmental costs could be considered to inflate avoided costs.
142
 
The affected utilities and others countered that first, federal law does not 
allow state regulation of wholesale sales to achieve state environmental 
goals, second, federal preemption cannot be avoided based on an 
environmental purpose of the preempted state regulation, and finally, 
states may not under the guise of environmental regulation adopt an 
economic regulation that requires purchases of electricity at a wholesale 
price outside the framework of the Federal Power Act, or if acting under 
PURPA, at a price that exceeds avoided cost.
143
  
FERC did not agree with California’s state FiT, and held that wholesale 
generators can receive no more than system-wide avoided cost for power 
sales: “even if a QF has been exempted pursuant to the Commission’s 
regulations from the ratemaking provisions of the Federal Power Act, a 
state still cannot impose a ratemaking regime inconsistent with the 
requirements of PURPA and this Commission’s regulations—i.e., a state 
cannot impose rates in excess of avoided cost.”144 FERC rejected all of 
 
 
 139. Paul Gipe, Time to Break Free of Net Metering; We Need a ‘FiT’ Policy for Renewable 
Energy to Soar, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Dec. 26, 2013, http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/ 
2013/12/26/break-free-net-metering/. 
 140. Indep. Energy Prod. Ass’n v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1994); S. 
Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC P 61, 215 (1995). 
 141. Id. Indep. Energy Prod. Ass’n, 36 F.3d at 853; S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC P at 215. Id. 
 142. FERC Order on Petitions for Declaratory Order, In re: Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 132 FERC P 
61,047 (2010). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
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California’s arguments regarding environmental rationales for wholesale 
rates in excess of limits under federal law or as set by FERC,
145
 when 
California made unsuccessful and somewhat unusual assertions in its legal 
defense that:
146
 
 Past constitutional principles in California precedent no longer 
apply to it because California’s innovative purpose was to 
target global warming 
 Ordering its utilities to offer to buy power at illegally 
impermissible rates is not the same as ordering them to 
actually buy that power 
The California Attorney General argued that mandating that regulated 
utilities only “offer” to purchase wholesale power at substantially above 
wholesale market rates, is different than a requirement to actually 
“purchase” the sold power.147 FERC held that this argument was 
unpersuasive.
148
 It held that its authority under the Federal Power Act 
includes the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the rates, terms and 
conditions of sales for resale of electric energy in interstate commerce.
149
  
California argued that its environmentally beneficial purposes should 
make it exempt from preemption in setting non-market-conforming 
wholesale rates for a state FiT.
150
 FERC found that no ancillary state 
purpose justifies a state’s requiring purchases of electricity at inflated 
wholesale prices,
151
 and renewable wholesale generators could receive no 
more than fair wholesale market prices under federal law.
152
 FERC 
reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce 
between the states, and California cannot attempt to regulate commerce 
outside its borders.
153
  
  
 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. See FERC Order Granting Clarification and Dismissing Rehearing, In re Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 133 FERC 61,059 (2010). 
 147. Id. at p. 72. 
 148. Id.  
 149. 16 U.S.C. §§§ 824, 824d, 824e (2006); e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 
487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
 150. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 132 FERC P 61,047. 
 151. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. FERC rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic environmental 
rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal law or set by FERC. Id. 
 152. FERC Order Granting Clarification and Dismissing Rehearing, In re Cal. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 133 FERC. P 61,059 (2010). 
 153. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] TORQUING THE LEVERS 285 
 
 
 
 
3. Costs 
State retail electricity regulatory commissions are required by law to 
fairly and equitably allocate investments and expenses of regulated 
utilities. This is their ultimate regulatory responsibility. Public utility law 
tracks the legal obligation to allocate costs and benefits of electricity 
service in a manner that is “fair and equitable,” “not unduly preferential,” 
“just and reasonable,” and “non-discriminatory” among consumers.154 
Regulatory scrutiny is intended to ensure that the only costs passed on to 
retail rates are “necessary and prudent.”155 The rate charged to one group 
should not impose a cost burden derived from a different pricing policy of 
another group.
156
  
Electricity rates must reflect the reasonable cost of production and the 
translation of total cost to “just and reasonable.”157 The allocation of rates 
among customer classes must be made based on the principles of tracking 
and reflecting costs of serving each reasonably distinct class of 
customers.
158
 Each specific rate to consumers must be “just and 
reasonable.”159 A nearly universal obligation imposed by federal and state 
laws on public utilities is the obligation to furnish service and to charge 
rates that will avoid undue or unjust discrimination among customers.
160
 
These principles are embedded in rate decisions of both FERC
161
 and state 
regulatory commissions
162
 and are reinforced when courts review the 
application of these principles by regulatory agencies.
163
 
Administratively-set FiT prices for power, whether in California or 
Oregon, have traditionally been too high, obligating utility customers to 
pay higher rates for decades of long-term contracts. In 2011, Oregon 
 
 
 154. EPA’s Clean Power Plan: States’ Tools for Reducing Costs and Increasing Benefits to 
Consumers, ANALYSIS GROUP (July 2014), available at http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/ 
content/insights/publishing/analysis_group_epa_clean_power_plan_report.pdf. 
 155. Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 36 F.P.C. 61, 70 (1966), aff’d sub nom. Midwestern Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 388 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1968). 
 156. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 568 (2d ed. 1988). 
 157. 16 U.S.C § 824d(e) (2012). 
 158. See Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[I]t has come to be 
well established that electrical rates should be based on the costs of providing service to the utility’s 
customers, plus a just and fair return on equity.”). 
 159. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
 160. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 515 (2d ed. 1988). If an 
electric plant is operating near full capacity, higher charges for on-peak versus off-peak would actually 
be required to avoid discrimination. Id. at 528. 
 161. Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc., 684 F.2d at 27. 
 162. Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 460.557(3)–(4) (LexisNexis 2010); see also Tex. Util. Code Ann. 
§ 36.003(a)–(c) (West 2007). 
 163. Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc., 684 F.2d at 27. 
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lowered the price paid under its solar FiT for the third time in its one year 
of existence, reducing it from its original 65 cents/Kwh to 37.4 
cents/Kwh.
164
 Each of the prior iterations at higher prices was 
oversubscribed within less than 10 minutes of its availability, even though 
each time the tariff was lowered 10-20% from the prior available price.
165
 
While Oregon officials claimed they were looking for the “sweet spot,” the 
unsweet spots of each of the former tariff iterations are forced into the bills 
of rate paying customers—essentially everyone else—for the successive 
15 years. In an international dimension, as set forth above, Germany 
slashed its initial feed-in tariffs in several stages to approximately half 
their values 7 years before.
166
 
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY MECHANISMS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
POWER: NET METERING AND RPS 
Net metering and renewable portfolio standards are the most utilized 
regulatory mechanisms in the U.S. to promote renewable energy. 
California, for example, has adopted both legal techniques, after being told 
for the third time in 2010 and 2011 that it was acting illegally in setting 
wholesale renewable power prices at inflated FiT levels. As a comparison 
internationally, Denmark net metering only allows excess from one hour 
to be applied to the next hour. Net metering at above the retail rate is 
implemented in Ontario, Canada.
167
  
A. Net Metering 
1. The Legal Mechanism 
Net metering has been the most used renewable energy incentive in the 
United States. FiTs are the most widely employed renewable energy 
policy in Europe and increasingly, the rest of the world.
168
 Approximately 
 
 
 164. Pam Russel, Oregon Reduces Solar Feed-In Tariff for Third Time, Looking for ‘Sweet Spot’ 
Price, ELEC. UTIL. WEEK, Aug. 8, 2011, at 7.  
 165. Id. 
 166. See, for example, regarding Germany decrease in tariff, David Hopwood & Paula Mints, 
Epia: Market Installed 7.2 Gw of Solar Pv in 2009, RENEWABLE ENERGY FOCUS, 
http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/12286/epia-market-installed-72-gw-of-solar-pv-in-2009/. 
 167. The FIT in Canada is set at CAD$ ~$0.33-$0.40/kWh for 20-year contracts; the average 
residential retail rate in Ontario is approximately CAD$ 0.14/kWh. 
 168. See Wilson Rickerson & Robert C. Grace, The Debate over Fixed Price Incentives for 
Renewable Electricity in Europe and the United States: Fallout and Future Directions, HEINRICH 
BÖLL FOUNDATION, Feb. 2007, available at http://www.ontario-sea.org/storage/27/1941_rickerson_ 
grace_final.pdf. 
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60 countries, including 18 European Union countries, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Israel, South Korea, Nicaragua, Norway, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and 
Turkey all used FiTs to promote and support renewable energy.
169
  
Under net metering, allowed in some form in 43 U.S. states, when the 
customer purchases and uses electricity from the distribution company, the 
meter runs forward; when more electricity is produced from the facility 
than is consumed by the customer, the excess is sent to the electricity grid, 
running the meter in reverse direction and reversing the net accounting of 
power flow.
170
 By turning the meter backwards, and because only a single 
rate applies to a single meter, net metering effectively compensates the 
generator at the full retail rate (which includes that approximately two-
thirds of the retail bill is attributable to transmission, distribution, and 
taxes) for transferring just the wholesale energy commodity in reverse to 
the utility—the power itself.171 A recent federal adjudicatory order casts 
uncertainty on the legality of some forms of net metering.
172
  
In essence, net metering customers receive for that power an amount 
that could be above the utility’s avoided cost, and reflects distribution 
investments made by the utility, not the QF. Net metering is not designed 
to allocate the fair or equitable price based on ratemaking law; it is a 
random price generally equal to the retail price, which has no direct 
relationship to the value of wholesale power traded in the market. 
Although established by state regulatory commission, the net metering rate 
is wholly divorced from ratemaking law and principles. It ignores that the 
net metering customer uses the distribution grid twice (power going and 
coming) and the rate supposes that the net metering customer does not use 
the grid at all. Net metering is more an accounting convention applied to 
trading power than it is a legal commodity sale according to case 
decisions, and it typically is applicable by state law and order to renewable 
sources of distributed power on the customer’s side of the retail utility 
meter.
173
 The potential for generation of system electric power by rooftop 
 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Glossary, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/glossary/. (“When a customer’s generation exceeds the customer’s use, 
electricity from the customer flows back to the grid, offsetting electricity consumed by the customer at 
a different time during the same billing cycle.”).  
 171. Id. (“In effect, the customer uses excess generation to offset electricity that the customer 
otherwise would have to purchase at the utility’s full retail rate.”). As to whether electricity is a “good” 
or a “service” and how it should be treated under the law. See STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A 
GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION 211–31 (2000). 
 172. Re: Sun Edison, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146 para. 18 (Nov. 19, 2009). 
 173. Steven Ferrey, Virtual ‘Nets’ and Law: Power Navigates the Supremacy Clause, 24 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012); see also Glossary, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR 
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PV units in each state is shown in Figure 9. The potential is greatest in 
California. 
FIGURE 9 
2. Costs 
A 2014 report concluded that net metering in California
174
  
 produces excessively large subsidies for typical residential 
rooftop solar PV facilities 
 cross-subsidies are paid by other residential customers 
 
 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/glossary/ (providing a definition of “net 
metering”). 
 174. Net Energy Metering, EDISON FOUNDATION, Sept. 2014, available at http://www.edison 
foundation.net/iei/documents/IEI_NEM_Subsidy_Issues_FINAL.pdf. The current net metering 
subsidy is calculated to be more than $20,000 for a modest rooftop solar PV project that costs about 
$14,500. Id. at 18. Most of these large subsidies go to the solar leasing companies in 2013. 
Potential % of Electricity from PV 
Rooftops by State 
145 
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 most of the burdened customers are less affluent than the 
rooftop solar PV customers 
 the subsidy is substantially larger than the 30% federal tax 
credit 
 An alternative arrangement which would require all rooftop 
solar PV customers to buy all of their consumed energy under 
the existing retail tariffs and separately sell all of their onsite 
generation to their distribution utilities at the utilities’ avoided 
costs.
175 
 
State utilities wanted stricter limits on the size of net metering units: San 
Diego Gas & Electric Company alleged that net metering provided an 
“unfair and unsustainable subsidy” of approximately $34 from each other 
customer to net metering customers.
176
 A study for the California Public 
Utilities Commission estimates that by 2020 approximately $1.1 billion 
would be shifted annually to support net metering customers under the 
existing scheme.
177
 The California Public Utility Commission reported that 
by 2020, net metering could cost non-solar electricity customers $370-$1.1 
billion per year.
178
 It documented that most homeowners with distributed 
solar systems had an average household income about twice that as the 
average household.
179
 California has preserved net metering for now, but 
AB 327 directed the state’s Public Utility Commission to come up with a 
new program by 2017 that ensures non-solar customers do not bear an 
unfair burden.
180
  
Both National Grid and Northeast Utilities, the parent company of 
NStar, the utility which owns Boston Edison Company, submitted 
testimony supporting the goals of the Massachusetts solar program but 
raising concerns about its costs. National Grid’s Ian Springsteel, the 
utility’s director of regulatory strategy, submitted testimony saying the 
price supports for solar “are set at very high levels relative to the revenues 
necessary to incentivize solar installations.”181 “National Grid estimated 
 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Lisa Weinzimer, Consumer and Solar Groups Pan SDG&E’s Planned Surcharge, Saying It 
May Be Illegal, ELEC. UTIL. WEEK, Nov. 21, 2011, at 18. 
 177. California Net Energy Metering Ratepayer Impacts Evaluation, ENERGY + ENVTL. ECON., 
INC., Oct. 28, 2013, at 6.  
 178. Than, supra note 43. 
 179. Id. Of $91,000 as compared to California’s state average of $54,000. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Bruce Mohl, The Back Story: Green Energy Concerns, COMMONWEALTH MAGAZINE, Aug. 
8, 2013. 
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the cost of $3.95/month per residential customer to pay for the 
Massachusetts RPS program, expected to rise by $1/month by 2015.”182 
National Grid estimated that net metering costs will more than double 
between summer 2013 and the end of the year ($0.09/month to 
$0.23/Month), and then more than triple again by the end of 
2014($0.93/month).
183 
This currently represents 5.4% of the typical 
residential customer bill, before all the projected increases.
184 
This 
indicates the slope of the trend line on net metering costs on individual 
bills. National Grid estimated publicly that the separate net metering cost 
more than doubled between summer 2013 and the end of 2013, and will 
more than triple from the 2014 amount again by the end of 2015. $4.04 
monthly is the cost of the two green energy mandates, which represents 
5.4% of the typical Grid customer’s monthly bill of $74.38/month, not 
including the state energy efficiency mandates which cost the typical 
customer another $4.70 a month.
185
 
The manager of power planning and supply for Northeast Utilities 
stated that solar subsidies at their current levels burden “ratepayers with 
unnecessary costs while overcompensating solar project owners for 
reasonable development costs that should more appropriately be borne by 
the project owners themselves.”186 The vice president for regulatory affairs 
at TransCanada, which sells electricity in New England, raised concerns 
about rising costs at a recent State House hearing on solar. “He said after 
the hearing that commercial/industrial electricity prices in Massachusetts, 
which are currently fifth-highest in the nation, could rise to number 2 
behind Hawaii in coming years due to clean energy mandates.”187 Utility 
companies in California estimate that net metering may mean as much as 
$1.4 billion a year in lost revenue, which will have to be added to the 
bills of non-net-metering customers.
188 
  
 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Letter from Northeast Utilities to Massachusetts DOER, Apr. 8, 2013, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/rps-aps/northeast-utilities-jeffrey-s-waltman.pdf.  
 187. Bruce Mohl, Green Energy Costs Raising Concerns, COMMONWEALTH MAGAZINE, Aug. 8, 
2013, available at http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/Voices/Back-Story/2013/Summer/004-
Green-energy-costs-raising-concerns.aspx 
 188. Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-threat-do-
it-yourself-power.html?_r=0. 
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3. Net Metering Energy Storage—The Missing Link for Power 
Unlike all other forms of energy, moving electrons cannot be 
efficiently stored as electricity for more than a second, before they are lost 
as waste heat.
189
 Therefore, the supply of electricity must match the 
demand for electricity over the centralized utility grid on an instantaneous, 
constant, real-time and ongoing basis, or else the electric system shuts 
down or expensive equipment is damaged.
190
 Either too much or too little 
power causes system instability on a second-by-second basis.
191
 Stability 
issues can be caused when PV inverters trip off because of grid voltage or 
frequency fluctuations.
192
  
 The critical missing link is storage of electricity. We do not have any 
means to store electricity per se. Instead, as a substitute, we convert 
electricity either into chemical energy in batteries,
193
 stored physical 
energy potential energy in compressed air or greater elevated reservoir 
capacity in hydroelectric pumped storage facilities, active physical energy 
in flywheel revolution, or thermal storage as heat.
194
 Pumped storage 
constitutes 95% of the storage utilized in the United States, and dominates 
storage of electric energy potential worldwide. See Figure 10.
195
   
 
 
 189. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 68, at 568. 
 190. Power Blackout Risks, CRO FORUM, available at https://www.allianz.com/v_13396777 
69000/media/responsibility/documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks.pdf.; see also FERREY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 68, at 568.  
 191. Power Blackout Risks, supra note 190. 
 192. Id. at 54. 
 193. IEA, PROSUMER, supra note 41, at 33. Battery storage has emerged as the key link for more 
deployment of intermittent sources of renewable energy such as solar and wind. Lithium-ion and lead-
acid batteries may or may not change electric technology in the near future by providing economic 
storage of intermittent power, although the storage costs are still quite high. Prices for lithium-ion 
batteries are projected to fall from $700/kWh in 2013 to $300/kWh in 2020-2025. The economics of 
grid defection: When and where distributed solar generation plus storage competes with traditional 
utility service. California Energy Commission, CEC‐500‐2011‐047, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
2011publications/CEC-500-2011-047/CEC-500-2011-047.pdf. 
 194. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 69, § 2.21. 
 195. Grid Energy Storage, DOE (2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/ 
12/f5/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20December%202013.pdf. 
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FIGURE 10 
  
a. The Physics of Power Intermittency, Cycling and Grid Stability 
The U.S. Department of Energy calculated that approximately 20% 
wind power can be accommodated on the grid, about the amount of back-
up reserve margin in regional power systems, without requiring additional 
storage or other mechanisms to accommodate intermittency.
196
 Studies 
conducted by National Renewable Energy Laboratory (“NREL”) have 
shown that more than one-third of the electricity in the western United 
States could come from wind and solar power without installing 
significant amounts of backup power or new interstate transmission 
lines.
197
 Adding more sustainable resources could negatively affect grid 
reliability. 
According to the National Energy Resource Council (“NERC”), which 
is responsible for maintaining US grid reliability, regulating and 
sequestering carbon emissions will compromise grid reliability and require 
up to half of the electricity produced by electric power generators.
198
 
NERC has been concerned that the renewable production standards 
 
 
 196. J. DeCesaro et al., Wind Energy and Power system Operations: A Review of Wind Integration 
Studies to Date, ELEC. J., Dec. 2009, at 34. Wind, being at off-peak times in many locations, will tend 
to displace typical coal base-load power, while solar PV units will tend to displace typical on-peak 
gas-fired peaking generation units. Id. 
 197. Wind Systems Integration—Western Wind and Solar Integration Study, NREL, 
http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/wwsis.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 198. Public Utilities Fear That Ghg Cuts Might Threaten Electricity Supply, Reliability, July 28, 
2008, http://www.cleanenergyreport.com (las visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
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(“RPS”) in two-thirds of U.S. states and four Canadian provinces could 
cause early substitution of traditional coal-fired power with renewable 
power, and simultaneously decrease grid reliability.
199
 Studies have 
estimated the cost of power disturbances across all business sectors in the 
U.S. at between $104 and $164 billion a year as a result of outages and 
another $15 to $24 billion due to degradation of power quality 
phenomena.
200
 The cost of a massive blackout is estimated to be about $10 
billion per event.
201
  
Intermittent wind and solar renewable resources cannot supply reliable 
base load power, as they demonstrate a relatively low availability factor in 
the 10–40% range of hours during a week or month.202 Wind generators 
have plant effective capacity factors of 20–30%. This will affect the 
dispatch and operation of other power generation resources. 
Even at 20% wind penetration in a grid, there could be a 33–50% 
decline in the running of combined cycle fossil-fuel generation units, and 
it is unclear whether these units could run profitably at these levels, or 
would exit the market.
203
 Coal-fired units typically are large (because of 
coal being a less dense fossil fuel) and must operate at at least 45-50% or 
greater of their design capacities.
204
 If coal-fired power plants are forced to 
cycle on and off more, it will result in significantly higher operation and 
maintenance expenses, increased heat rate, which is a proxy for 
inefficiency, increased start-up costs and a shorter life of the unit.
205
  
One analysis of coal-plant cycling against intermittent renewable 
power’s hourly variations found that emissions during cycling were 8% 
higher for sulfur dioxide and 10% higher for nitrogen oxides than 
emissions of the same compounds during constant operation.
206
 Moreover, 
while generators spin to increase their temperatures to their design values, 
the power that these units produce may or may not be used by the grid, 
 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. The Cost of Power Disturbances to Industrial and Digital Economy Companies, EPRI, Mar. 
18, 2013, available at http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000 
0003002000476. 
 201. U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 
Blackout in the United States and Canada, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.demandresponse 
partners.com/files/papers/blackoutfinal_web.pdf. 
 202. See LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 69, § 2:11 (noting inability of intermittent 
sources to serve as base-load resource). 
 203. J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in Integrating Large 
Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33 (Aug.–Sept. 2010). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. at 38. 
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thus incurring power “uplift” costs to the grid.207 While the more modern 
coal plants have the ability to ramp up and down more flexibly than older 
units, they do not have the flexibility to match the real-time variability to 
match fluctuations in wind power availability to keep the grid constantly 
supplied.
208
 
Even though they are better able to cycle up and down than coal plants, 
natural gas combined cycle turbine facilities, which can be modified to 
increase by up to 50% their start-up times to accommodate pressure and 
temperature transients of their steam turbines and readiness of their heat 
recovery steam generators, still may not be able to follow the 
intermittency of greater renewable power in the grid.
209
 If they can be 
adapted to do so, these gas combined cycle units will experience higher 
heat rates, less efficient operation, greater maintenance and 
unavailability.
210
 European data illustrates that there has been a shift from 
traditional coal unit operation to more operation of gas combined cycle 
units since the regulation of CO2 emissions.
211
 This has resulted in an 
increase in these units’ O&M costs, more frequent outages, and less 
availability.
212
 
An analysis of coal plant cycling up and down to match intermittent 
wind or other renewable power hourly variations found that emissions 
increased by 8% more SO2 and 10% more NOx than at constant 
operation.
213
 “If the ambitious levels of renewable generation (mainly 
wind) established by RPS mandates are to be successfully integrated into 
electricity markets, policymakers and regulators will have to make sure 
that fast up- and down-ramping generation resources are available as 
operating reserves to the grid operator.”214  
b. International Grid Stability Issues 
By 2007, Spain recognized that grid insecurity caused by the 
intermittent nature of solar and wind generation were limited in eligibility 
for grid capacity guarantee payments, yet the FiT increased to E58 
 
 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id.at 37. 
 209. Id. at 38–39, 42. 
 210. Id. at 42. 
 211. Edward W. Platt & Richard B. Jones, The Impact of Carbon Trading on Performance: What 
Europe’s Experience can Teach North American Generators, POWER (Jan. 2010). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See supra note 207. 
 214. Id. at 42; see also Adrienne M. Ohler & Kristi Radusewicz, Indirect Impacts in Illinois from 
a Renewable Portfolio Standard, 23 ELEC. J. 65 (2010). 
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cents/Kwh for solar PV projects.
215
 These experiences illustrate significant 
externalities that are associated with renewable energy expansion. First, 
grid modifications, upgraded circuits and transformers, and expansion of 
the transmission and distribution infrastructure, are necessary for 
renewables, but not otherwise required at anywhere near this degree.
216
 In 
Germany, this already resulted in an additional €1 billion of cost, with tens 
of billions more of investment required.
217
 Second, there is a need for 
installation on the system of more quick-start spinning reserve to respond 
to the constant intermittency of solar and wind generation and provide 
load-following generation.
218
 Twenty power companies, including 
Germany’s biggest utilities, are now paid for agreeing to add or cut 
electricity within seconds to keep the power system stable. The cost of this 
power generator cycling doubled in a year, in an 800 million euro ($1.1 
billion) balancing market.
219
 There are five times as many potential 
disruptions due to grid instability caused in significant part by more 
intermittent generation, as four years before, raising the risk of 
blackouts.
220
  
 Adding a significant intermittent DG component, even if load demand 
characteristics do not change, increases the need for spinning reserve, 
increases the amount of fuel consumed to spin that reserve, and 
consequently increases the system out-of-pocket fuel and other marginal 
costs incurred to maintain unchanged, consistent system reliability.
221
 
There are real costs associated with necessary greater amounts of spinning 
reserve and back-up power, which impose additional costs on maintenance 
of system reliability which were not there before.
222
   
 
 
 215. Lincoln Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L.R. 937, 975 
(2014). 
 216. Id. at 1002. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. 
 219. Julia Mengewein, German Push for Renewable Power Outlet Doubles Utilities Joining 
Balancing Market, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT, July 25, 2014. 
 220. Id. One grid operator requiring balancing adjusts of generation 1,009 times in 2013 to 
stabilize the grid, 209 times in 2010. In Germany’s balancing market auctions, winning bidders have 
been paid as much as 13,922 euros ($18,700) to pledge set aside one megawatt for balancing services 
provided on notice of 15 minutes, 5 minutes or 30 seconds. 
 221. See supra Part IV.A.3.a. 
 222. Id. 
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B. Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
1. Creation of ‘Virtual’ Credits  
A resource portfolio standard or requirement (“RPS”) requires certain 
electricity sellers and buyers to maintain evidence of a predetermined 
percentage of designated clean resources in their wholesale electric supply 
mixes.
223
 Independent generators of renewable power then make direct 
sales of their renewable energy credits (“RECs”) to retail suppliers of 
power, which are required by RPS laws to purchase enough RECs each 
year to equal the required percentage of power generation set by the state 
regulatory authority. RPS programs have been characterized as a form of 
“backdoor” renewable subsidies.224  
Twenty-nine U.S. states and the District of Columbia have RPS.
225
 It is 
estimated that 45% of the 4,300 MW of wind power installed in the U.S. 
between 2001-2004 was motivated by state renewable portfolio standards, 
while an additional 15% of these installations were motivated by state 
renewable energy trust funds and subsidies.
226
 The current RPS standards 
are projected to add 76,750 MW of additional renewable generation by 
2025.
227 
  
 
 
 223. The resources such as renewables, DSM, or high efficiency fossil combustion, as defined by 
a particular state, would be included in the company’s overall resource portfolio. Portfolio 
requirements can be applied to electricity sellers, such as generation companies and vertically 
integrated utilities as a condition of continued market access. The requirements could also be applied 
to wholesale electricity buyers, such as distribution companies and electricity brokers but the states do 
not exercise authority over wholesale markets. 
 224. Robert Glennon & Andrew M. Reeves, Solar Energy’s Cloudy Future, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. 
LAW & POL’Y 91, 106 (2010). 
 225.  See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIREUSA.ORG, Mar. 2013, http://www.dsire 
usa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
 226. Ryan Wiser & Mark Bolinger , Balancing Cost and Risk: The Treatment of Renewable 
Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans, Elec. J., Aug. 10, 2005, available at http://escholarship. 
org/uc/item/37p4j85p. 
 227. Brad Plumer, The Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy Is Now in the States, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 25, 2013, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/25/the-biggest-
fights-over-renewable-energy-are-now-happening-in-the-states/. 
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2. Navigating Legal Barriers to Leakage in the U.S. 
A major practical and policy issue
228
 is the so-called “leakage” into a 
state or country of external unregulated and less-costly power.
229
 In the 
U.S., state laws that attempt to arrest leakage by regulatory measures that 
differentially treat the energy commerce of out-of-state businesses can also 
violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
230
 These laws can 
assume the form of added fees or taxes and charges on out-of-state 
goods.
231
 States are prohibited from attaching restrictions to any goods that 
they import from other states: “States and localities may not attach 
restrictions to . . . imports in order to control commerce in other States.”232 
States cannot regulate in ways where the practical effect is to control 
conduct in other states.
233
  
A state cannot regulate in favor of, or require use of, its own in-state 
energy resources even for a small percentage of total use,
234
 nor can it, by 
regulation, harbor energy-related resources originating in the state.
235
 The 
use of in-state fuels cannot be required by a state even to satisfy federal 
Clean Air Act requirements.
236
 Income tax credits cannot be given by a 
state only to in-state producers of fuel additives.
237
 The Supreme Court 
 
 
 228.  Cap and Trade Program Design Options Report of the Cap and Trade Subgroup of the 
Climate Action Team: Final Report, available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_ 
action_team/reports/2006-03-27_CAP_AND_TRADE.pdf. 
 229. See RGGI Emissions Leakage Multi-State Staff Working Group, Potential Emissions 
Leakage and RGGI: Evaluating Market Dynamics, Monitoring Options and Possible Mitigation 
Mechanisms, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf. States 
such as New Jersey, New York, Maryland and New Delaware are bordered by states that are not 
signatories to RGGI and do historically produce a large of volume of electricity from coal-fueled 
power plants. Similarly, California imports power from 11 states, including a large amount of coal-
fired power. See California Energy Commission, 2006 Gross System Electricity Production, available 
at https://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/gross_system_power.html (showing California imports 
approximately 10% of its total electricity from out of state coal plants).  
 230. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27, 343 (1989) (striking 
requirement that the price of beer was not higher than that charged out-of-state). 
 231. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1992) (invalidating an 
Alabama law imposing an extra fee on imported hazardous waste). 
 232. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994). 
 233. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. 
 234. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–56 (1992). The Oklahoma statute overturned 
involved only a 10% allocation of the market to in-state producers. As a result of the statute, the 
market changed in response from use of almost all out-of-state coal to “the utilities purchased [in-state] 
Oklahoma coal in amounts ranging from 3.4% to 7.4% of their annual needs, with a necessarily 
corresponding reduction in purchases of Wyoming coal.” See also Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 
840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 235. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982). 
 236. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596–97(7th Cir. 1995). 
 237. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 278–80 (1988). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:255 
 
 
 
 
consistently has required that the regulation of power by the states must 
not discriminate regarding the origin of power or the ultimate impact that 
may discourage its flow in interstate commerce:
238
  
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution precludes a state from mandating that its residents be 
given a preferred right of access, over out‐of‐state consumers, to 
natural resources located within its borders or to the products 
derived therefrom. [A] State is without power to prevent privately 
owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate 
commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local 
demands or because they are needed by the people of the State.
239
 
Recent federal court opinions construing state electricity regulation have 
scrupulously followed this doctrine: 
[A state is ‘without power to prevent privately owned articles of 
trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the 
ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because 
they are needed by the people of the State (quoting Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey at 627, quoting Foster Fountain Packing Co., at 10).
240
 
Most recently, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service 
Operator’s (“MISO”)241 proportionate customer utility allocation of 
transmission costs for high-voltage transmission lines to move renewable 
wind power to populated areas.
242
 For the authority for its holding on the 
respective jurisdiction of state and federal government to regulate 
electricity, the opinion relied on a 2012 law review article by this 
author.
243
 The decision, in dicta, declared unconstitutional a state’s 
 
 
 238. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (overturning as a violation 
of the dormant Commerce Clause an order of the state Public Utilities Commission that restrained 
within the state for the financial advantage of in-state ratepayers, renewable power produced within the 
state).  
 239. Id. 
 240. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, supra note 134, slip op. at 83–84. 
 241. MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and parts of 
Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana. MISO ENERGY, 
https://www.misoenergy.org/Pages/Home.aspx. 
 242. Illinois Commerce Com’n. v. Federal Regulatory Com’n, 721 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2013). 
MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects among all of the utilities who draw power from 
the MISO grid in proportion to each utilities’ overall volume of usage; FERC approved MISO’s rate 
design, which led some states to initiate court appeal. 
 243. Id. at 776.  
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limiting state renewable portfolio standards to in-state generation, as a 
violation of the Commerce Clause “Michigan cannot, without violating the 
commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-
of-state renewable energy.”244 Justice Scalia, concurring in the majority 
prior opinion in West Lynn Creamery, submitted that, “subsidies for in-
state industry . . . would clearly be invalid under any formulation of the 
Court’s guiding principle” for “dormant” Commerce Clause cases.245 
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits actions that are facially 
discriminatory against interstate commerce.
246
 A regulation that “evinces” 
discriminatory purpose against interstate commerce “or unambiguously 
discriminates in its effect . . . almost always is ‘invalid per se.’”247 All 
objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection, which 
particularly includes electric energy in interstate commerce according to 
the Supreme Court
248
: 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate 
commerce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every 
home and every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State 
relies solely on its own resources in this respect.
249
 
Renewable portfolio standards at the state level do not raise constitutional 
Supremacy Clause issues, but the design of some state programs raise 
dormant Commerce Clause issues.
250
 There are a number of the twenty-
nine states with RPS that have incorporated credit multipliers, geographic 
restrictions, or preferences to promote in-state/in-region generation of 
power, to the exclusion of external power, in the following percentages:  
 
 
 244. Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination in its RPS 
program as a demonstration that out-of-state powered transmitted to it was not recognized as of the 
same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan should not pay a share of power line tariffs 
transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal recognition and benefit. Instead of 
supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge Posner to respond to this assertion, even though it 
was not the tariff issue before the Court. Id. 
 245. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 246. Department of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, 
Inc v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).  
 247. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 248. See New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) (“[T]ransmissions on the interconnected 
national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce.”). 
 249. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). 
 250. See supra Part II.C. 
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 Eight of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 27%, have REC 
multipliers for in-state generation: Arizona,
251
 Colorado,
252
 
Delaware,
253
 Maine,
254
 Michigan,
255
 Missouri,
256
 Nevada,
257
 
and Washington.
258
 
 Four of the RPS states, or 14%, including two states that also 
provide for a geographically discriminatory REC multiplier, 
have either a requirement or preference for in-state generation: 
California,
259
 Colorado,
260
 North Carolina,
261
 and Ohio.
262
 
 Four of the twenty-nine RPS states, or 14%, give program 
preferences to the use of in-state manufactured products or in-
state labor forces: Arizona,
263
 Delaware,
264
 Michigan,
265
 and 
Montana.
266
 
 Eleven of the twenty-nine RPS states, representing 38% of 
RPS states, have a requirement for in-region, rather than in-
state, geographic location of generation to create RECs, 
including one of the states that also has in-state multipliers and 
one with an in-state preference: Connecticut,
267
 Illinois,
268
 
Maine,
269
 Maryland,
270
 Massachusetts,
271
 New Hampshire,
272
 
 
 
 251. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2009). 
 252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(c)(V)(A)–(D), (c)(IX), (d) (2013). 
 253. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356(a)(1), (d)–(e) (2012). 
 254. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2010). 
 255. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.1039(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 256. MO. ANN. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (West 2013). 
 257. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 704.7822 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 258. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110(1)(d)(i)–(iii) (2015).  
 259. California Incentives/Policies for Renewables Efficiency, Database St. Incentives for 
Renewables & Efficiency, DSIRE, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code= 
CA25R&re=1&ee=1 (last updated Oct. 30, 2013) (explaining that a maximum of 25% of RPS 
compliance can be achieved through the use of tradable renewable energy credits; therefore, the 
remainder of the RPS compliance must be attained through in-state power sales). 
 260. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(e)(II)–(III) (2013). 
 261. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (West 2012). 
 262. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 263. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806(D)–(E) (2007). 
 264. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 351(b)–(c) (2009). 
 265. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 460.1001(2)(a)–(d) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 266. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2013). 
 267. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245a(b) (West 2013). 
 268. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3855/1-56(b) (West 2013). 
 269. 65-407-311 ME. CODE R. § 6 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 270. MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03(D) (2011). 
 271. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F(a) (LexisNexis 2013). 
 272. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(I) (LexisNexis 2011). 
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North Carolina, Ohio,
273
 Oregon,
274
 Pennsylvania,
275
 and 
Rhode Island.
276
 
 Eleven of the twenty-nine states, or 38%, have an in-state 
requirement for certain distributed power.
277
 
 Four of the twenty-nine states, or 14%, have a benefit for an 
in-state capital component or labor.
278
 
 Some states have multiple multipliers and preferences.279 
 Only seven of the twenty-nine states, or 24%, have no 
geographic preferences in their laws.
280
 
There was successful litigation alleging that Massachusetts’ renewable 
energy tradable energy credits under capped incentives violated the 
Constitution.
281
 The program was successfully challenged on 
Constitutional grounds in 2010 by TransCanada Corporation, the owner of 
a Maine wind project.
282
 The suit alleged that Massachusetts’ limitation on 
eligible solar Renewable Energy Credits (“SRECs”), as well as issuance of 
long-term power purchase contracts only to Massachusetts companies, 
both discriminated against out-of-state renewable energy projects in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
283
 
After stating that it had confidence in its position, Massachusetts 
immediately settled the litigation so as to avoid a court decision, providing 
that TransCanada would be eligible for these programs.
284
  
 
 
 273. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(C)(5) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 274. OR. REV. STAT. § 469A.135(1)(a), (2) (2011). 
 275. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West 2008). 
 276. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2012). 
 277. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause 
Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 75–77 
(2012) (noting that resource eligibility in state RPS programs has expanded beyond traditional 
renewables). 
 278. Steven Ferrey, Alternative Energy in a Spaghetti Western: Clint Eastwood Confronts State 
Renewable Energy Policy, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2012) (listing Arizona, Delaware, 
Michigan, and Montana as having this in-state benefit). 
 279. Id. at 291–92. 
 280. Id. at 292. 
 281. Transcanada Power Mktg., Ltd. v. Bowles et al., No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 
2010), available at http://www.ohiogreenstrategies.com/documents/transcanada.pdf. E. Ailworth, State 
Looking to Settle Suit over Law on Clean Energy, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/05/27/lawsuit_hits_mass_law_promoting_local_energy
_providers/. 
 282. Id.  
 283. Id.  
 284. See Massachusetts Dept. of Energy Resources, Partial Settlement Agreement with 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
302 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:255 
 
 
 
 
A 2013 decision of the federal court held that a statute banning the 
import of foreign coal or coal-produced power into Minnesota or the 
construction of new plants that would burn external coal was 
unconstitutional
285
: 
Such a scenario is “just the kind of competing and interlocking local 
economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to 
preclude.” Healy, 491 U.S. at 337286 . . . “any attempt directly to 
asset extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would 
offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of State’s 
power.”287  
3. Costs  
a. U.S. Costs 
The price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects has been 
estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates (in Maine, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York) to up to 1.1% retail rate impact in 
Massachusetts.
288
 In a 2004 ruling, an Administrative Law Judge of the 
New York Public Service Commission, concluded that this renewable 
portfolio standard would raise residential rates by 1.8%, commercial rates 
by 2% and industrial rates by 2.4%. It would cut statewide emissions of 
NOx by 6.8%, sulfur dioxide by 5.9%, and CO2 by 7.7%.
289
 New Jersey 
utility ratepayers already have paid $388 million in rebates and other 
financial incentives for programs to promote solar panels, wind projects, 
 
 
TransCanada, MASS.GOV, available at http://www.mass.gov/Eoeea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/ 
Settlement-Agreement.pdf. 
 285. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 2014 WL 1612331, 1 (D. Mn. Apr. 18, 2014). Exemptions were 
made for the proposed Excelsior Energy integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant in 
northern Minnesota, the Big Stone II coal plant in South Dakota, and the Maple Grove-based Great 
River Energy’s Spiritwood Station plant in North Dakota. Minn. Stat. § 216B.1694, subd. 1 (2008). 
 286. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 918. 
 287. Id. at 911 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982)). North Dakota and 
representatives of its coal industry also sued Minnesota on Article VI grounds alleging it imposes 
Constitutional violations when it affects the wholesale price and transmission of power within 
exclusive federal authority regarding wholesale electricity pricing, which the court did not need to 
reach, having already found the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 916. 
 288. Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, 
8 ELEC. J. 20, at Fig. 4 (2007). An impact of not more than approximately 1% is forecast to be the cost 
of this implementation. 
 289. N.Y. ALJ Recommends Renewable Standard Reaching 25% by 2013, with Old Hydro, ELEC. 
UTIL. WEEK, June 7, 2004, at 7. The ruling also envisions a trading system of renewable energy 
credits.  
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and other renewable energy initiatives.
290
 The New Jersey Division of Rate 
Counsel head asked for a more transparent pricing scheme.
291
  
In 2014, Ohio became the first state to freeze its RPS program, 
negating the annual legislated increase in RPS requirements for two 
years.
292
 The RPS requirement remained, but did not advance as originally 
legislated. This did not repeal the Ohio RPS program, but retarded its 
inclining curve of greater renewable energy credit purchase by utilities for 
two years.  
b. International Costs 
Figure 11 illustrates the results of different electric generation policies. 
The U.S. has achieved the lowest retail prices for power of any of the 
major nations. Prices in the U.S. are below those of France, which 
generates three-quarters of its power from low-cost nuclear power, and 
less than half the price of electricity in Germany, where there are 
significant technology cross-subsidies built into retail rates through FiTs, 
at well beyond the wholesale price of power. These added costs are passed 
on to rate payers. Spain now pays almost 1% of its GDP in subsidies for 
renewables power, which is more than it spends on higher education.
293
  
 
 
 290. Tom Johnson, What Does It Really Cost Utility Customers to Subsidize Clean Energy?, N.J. 
SPOTLIGHT, Oct. 8, 2013, available at http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/10/07/what-does-it-
really-cost-utility-customers-to-subsidize-clean-energy/. This does not include to more recent market-
based solar program funded by subsidies on customer utility bills, which in 2012 raised $309 million. 
“We don’t know exactly what the cost is,’’ conceded New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel Director 
Stefanie Brand, who has been a proponent of bringing more transparency to the process. “It’s good for 
the public to know what they are paying.’’ Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Tom Knox, The Freeze Is on—Kasich Signs S.B. 310, Halts Renewable and Energy-
Efficiency Standards, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST, June 13, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/ 
news/2014/06/13/the-freeze-is-on-kasich-signs-s-b-310-halts.html. In June 2014, Ohio enacted Senate 
Bill 310 to freeze for two years renewable energy and energy efficiency cross-subsidies, making Ohio 
the first state to back off its RPS. Id. As a result, Ohio’s renewable energy mandate will remain at 
2.5% and its energy efficiency standard at 4.2% compared to 2009 levels for the next two years. Id. A 
legislative committee will review the standards enacted in 2008, which provide that 25% of the 
electricity sold by Ohio utilities must be generated from alternative energy sources. Id. Half of that 
must come from renewables like wind power, solar must account for at least 0.5% of the renewables 
load, and utilities must slash customers’ power usage by 22% in the same time frame. Id. 
 293. Id. 
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FIGURE 11: AVERAGE RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICES IN EUROPE, CHINA, 
AND U.S., 1999–2012 
Figure 12 illustrates comparative retail electricity prices for industrial 
companies in respective international countries. 
FIGURE 12: AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL RETAIL ELECTRICITY PRICES IN 
EUROPE, CHINA, AND U.S., 1999–2012 
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V. HOW INTERNATIONAL LEVERS OF POWER MUST BE ACTIVATED 
A. One Regulatory Size Does Not Fit All  
The power technology to arrest climate change exists;
294
 it is the legal 
and regulatory mechanisms to successfully deploy sufficient new clean 
technologies that are lacking. In redressing climate change and global 
warming, one size, legally, has not proven to fit all. The most used 
mechanism in the European Union and internationally to promote quick 
implementation of renewable power is feed-in tariffs. However, under the 
U.S. constitutional system and the Federal Power Act, the 48 continental 
states have no power to enact feed-in tariffs. Such federalist forms of 
government characterize several other large and established countries, 
including Germany, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, India, Brazil, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and Nigeria.  
The alternative mechanisms most used by 29 states in the United States 
and some other countries to support sustainable energy development are 
RPS, and, in 43 states, net metering. However, many countries have no 
effective mechanism to promote renewable power. Consequently, 
renewable energy use is less significant in percentage terms than it was 
200 years ago.  
In 1800, the world obtained 94% of its energy from renewable 
sources.
295
 That figure has been declining consistently since. 13.12% of 
the world’s energy came from renewable power in 1971;296 forty years 
later in 2011, renewable power’s share was 12.99%.297 In the United 
States, renewable energy accounted for 9.3% of energy production in 
1949, and is projected to rise to 10.8% by 2040. In China, renewable 
energy production dropped from 40% in 1971 to 11% in the present day.
298
 
While the leading renewable energy technologies have made 
substantial percentage gains, their slice of the total energy pie is still 
modest. In 1990, wind produced 0.0038% of the world’s energy; it now 
 
 
 294. Andrea Vittorio, Countries Could Double Global Share, supra note 8. 
 295. Bjørn Lomborg, Green Energy Needs to be Cheaper, So Let’s Invest in R&D Instead of 
Subsidies, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/project_syndicate/2013/08/ 
green_energy_subsidies_for_solar_and_wind_power_aren_t_helping_let_s_invest.html; see also Todd 
Woody, The Next Big Innovation in Renewable Energy Won’t Be Technological, It Will be Financial, 
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 11 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2013/11/the-next-big-innovation-in-renewable-energy-wont-be-technological/281345/. 
 296. Id. 1971 is the first year that the IEA reported global statistics. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
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produces 0.29%.
299
 Solar photovoltaic electric power production was close 
to 0% in 1990; it is now 0.04%.
300
 Europe now achieves 1% of its energy 
production from wind power, a smaller percentage than before European 
industrialization.
301
 The U.K. gained its maximum amount of total energy 
at 2.5% from wind power in 1804, while it is less than 1% today.
302
  
Each of these mechanisms must be employed sensibly, or face its own 
legal issues. RPS, net metering, and FiTs each cross-subsidize one group 
of consumers by imposing the total program subsidy costs on other groups 
of the utility’s consumers, and there can be an impact on utilities. While 
employing assertive FiTs, EU utilities have suffered vast losses in asset 
valuation, with their market capitalization having fallen by over E500 
billion over the last five years.
303
 In May 2014, Barclays downgraded all 
high-grade bonds issued by the entire American electric utility sector 
because they “believe that a confluence of declining cost trends in 
distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) power generation and residential-scale 
power storage is likely to disrupt the status quo.”304 It is expected that 
these trends will reduce the profitability and credit-worthiness of utilities 
with increased deployment of renewable energy.
305
  
In Europe, utility cash flows have been decreased from reduced 
operating hours for conventional plants.
306
 Utilities in Europe are also 
reported to be actively seeking partnerships with institutional investors to 
whom they might unload sustainable energy assets from their balance 
sheets.
307
  
 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. How to Lose Half a Trillion Euros, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2014, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21587782-europes-electricity-providers-face-existential-threat-
how-lose-half-trillion-euros. 
 304. Michael Aneiro, Barclays Downgrades Electric Utility Bonds, Sees Viable Solar 
Competition, BARRON’S, May 23, 2014, available at http://blogs.barrons.com/incomeinvesting/2014/ 
05/23/barclays-downgrades-electric-utility-bonds-sees-viable-solar-competition/.  
 305. International Energy Agency, Medium Term Renewables Outlook, IEA, Paris, 2014. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Christoph Steitz, Interview—E.ON Bets on Investor Help for Wind Power Push, REUTERS, 
Aug. 26, 2014, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/26/e-on-renewables-idUKL5N0 
QW1D420140826. Fossil fuel assets have been characterized as having “the potential to become 
stranded due to a range of environment-related factors—from climate or other environmental 
regulations, developments in clean energy technology, resource constraints, evolving social norms and 
litigation.” Ben Caldecott et al., Summary of Proceedings, Stranded Assets Forum, Waddesdon Manor, 
STRANDED ASSETS PROGRAMME, Mar. 2014, available at www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/research/ 
stranded-assets/. 
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B. Developing Policy for Developing Nations  
Does this widespread adoption of renewable energy requirements in the 
E.U. and in two-thirds of U.S. states translate to similar action in the 
majority of developing countries? As set forth above, only about 40% of 
world carbon emissions are covered by those nations affected by the 
Kyoto Protocol. And it did not cover those major nations which constitute 
the fastest growing contribution to world carbon emissions—China, India, 
Indonesia, Brazil, etc. While the 2015 Paris COP-21 agreement includes 
all nations in a general commitment to reduce global warming emissions, 
it imposes no specific commitment on any nation and even the general 
commitment remains unenforceable. Neither of China, India, or Indonesia 
has a carbon policy to regulate the release of CO2 from the deployment of 
such coal reserves yet. The necessary international limits on CO2 
emissions do not exist in developing countries.  
This is the critical missing link. Climate warming cannot be controlled 
unless all significant carbon emitters in the world are appropriately and 
proportionately controlled. China is a particular example. China has now 
surpassed the United States as the largest CO2 emitter in the world. By 
2010, China had the highest emissions in the world per unit of gross 
national product (“GNP”) by a factor more than double that of any other 
nation. In 2005 China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP was just 
more than three times the level of the United States, more than five times 
that of Germany and eight times that of Japan.
308
 Projections estimate that 
by 2030, China’s GHG emissions will quadruple and Asia alone will emit 
60 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions.309  
While China is developing some renewable power, it adds yearly 40 
times more new coal capacity than new wind power capacity.
310
 In 2007, 
China built more new coal-fired power plants than Britain, the seat of the 
coal-fired industrial revolution, built in its entire history.
311 
At the end of 
2012, there were 363 coal-fired plants with a combined generating 
 
 
 308. Energy Consumption per Unit of Gdp Continues to Fall, CHINA DAILY, July 15, 2007, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2008-07/15/content_6847891.htm. 
 309. D.E. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming’s Sleeping Giant, 11 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 405 (1999).  
 310. Id. 
 311. See Roger Harrabin, China Building More Power Plants, BBC NEWS, June 19, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6769743.stm; Mark Clayton, Global Boom in Coal 
Power and Emissions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/ 
0322/p01s04-wogi.htm. 
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capacity of 557,938 Mw proposed to be built in China.
312
 The intensity of 
China’s growth is unprecedented in any other developing country in the 
world,
313 
with a growth rate of GDP at more than 10% for the last three 
decades.
314  
China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting 
for almost as much coal as the rest of the world combined.
315 
China 
accounted for 46% of global coal consumption five years ago.
316 
According to the International Energy Agency, electricity generation 
accounted for 44% of CO2 emissions in 2010.
317 
China and India harbor 
around one-quarter of the world’s coal reserves and are deploying them 
rapidly to fire electric power plants.
318 
India has targeted 100,000 MW in 
new capacity over the next ten years.
319
 China is installing 1000 MW of 
coal power generation each week. By the year 2030, coal-fired power in 
India and China will add 3000 million extra tons of CO2 to the atmosphere 
every year.
320 
Therefore, the additional CO2 emissions from the China and 
India electric power sectors alone will constitute approximately 10% of all 
world CO2 emissions from all sources.
321
  
Coal consumption in Asia is more than triple the coal consumption in 
the U.S. and the E.U. combined. China is currently installing 1 GW of coal 
power generation each week and predictions are that by the year 2030, 
 
 
 312. Ailun Yang & Yiyun Cui, Global Coal Risk Assessment: Data Analysis and Market 
Research, WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE, Nov. 2012, available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/global_coal_risk_assessment.pdf [hereinafter “Global Coal Risk Assessment: Data Analysis 
and Market Research”].  
 313. Li Meixian, China's Compliance with Wto Requirements Will Improve the Efficiency and 
Effective Implementation of Environmental Laws in China, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 155 (Spring 
2004). 
 314. Michael Schuman, The Real Reason to Worry About China, TIME, Apr. 28, 2013 available at 
http://business.time.com/2013/04/28/the-real-reason-to-worry-about-china/. 
 315. Andrea Vittorio, Limiting Global Warming ‘Almost Impossible’ Without Limits on Coal in 
China, Report Says, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT (discussing U.S. Energy 
Information Administration data). 
 316. Yang & Cui, supra note 312. 
 317. RICHARD BARON ET AL., POLICY OPTIONS FOR LOW CARBON POWER GENERATION IN CHINA 
(2012). 
 318. Lord Ronald Oxburgh, Capturing the Moment, PARLIAMENTARY MONITOR, July 
21, 2006. 
 319. India Country Analysis Brief, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/ 
india.html. 
 320. Ray Purdy, The Legal Implications Of Carbon Capture And Storage Under The Sea, 7 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 1, Fall 2006, at 23 (citing House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee, Meeting UK Energy and Climate Needs: The Role of Carbon Capture and 
Storage; First Report of Session 2005–06; Volume 1; HC 578-I; Stationary Office Ltd. (2006)). 
 321. Id. at 23. 
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coal-fired power in India and China will add 3 billion extra tons of CO2 to 
the atmosphere every year.
322
  
China’s demand for electricity will rise 46% by 2020 and double by 
2030, according to the International Energy Agency.
323
 China currently 
depends on coal for two-thirds of its energy, more than any other Group of 
20 country except South Africa.
324
 In order to avoid shortages and satisfy 
demand, China would have to increase capacity to approximately 40 GW 
annually.
325
 The recent agreement between China and the U.S. to cap 
China CO2 emissions by 2030 would require China to produce either 67 
times more nuclear energy than the country is forecast to have at the end 
of 2014 or 30 times more solar.
326
  
Countries’ recent pledges to fight climate change by cutting their 
carbon dioxide emissions are unlikely to affect global increases in coal use 
and emissions. According to the International Energy Agency, global 
demand still makes coal the fastest-growing fossil fuel and will rise 2.1% 
annually, driven mainly by China, India and other expanding Asian 
economies.
327
 It will be “almost impossible” for the world to limit global 
warming to 2º Celsius (3.6º Fahrenheit) unless China puts limits on its coal 
consumption within the next decade.
328
 In China, renewables’ share in 
energy production dropped from 40% in 1971 to 11% today; in 2035, it 
will likely be just 9%, according to one observer.
329
 More than 15% of 
Chinese wind power was idled in the first half of 2015 because the 
Chinese grid cannot carry the power.
330
 
However, for an industry as capital-intensive as electricity production, 
the levers of finance always matter. The World Bank, the US Export-
Import Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
 
 
 322. Id.  
 323. Feifei Shen & Iain Wilson, Nuclear Power: China Will Need to Build 1,000 Nuclear Plants 
to Meet Emissions Reduction Target, BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT, Nov. 21, 2014. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Boon-Siew Yeoh & Rajesh Rajaraman, Electricity in China: The Latest Reforms, 17 ELEC. J. 
3 (Apr. 2004), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222385326_Electricity_in_ China 
_The_Latest_Reforms.  
 326. Shen, supra note 330.  
 327. Rick Mitchel, IEA Says Climate Pledges Won’t Halt Global Growth in Coal Demand to 
2019, BLOOMBERG BNA ENV’T REP., Dec. 15, 2014. India, averaging 5% annual coal demand growth, 
should pass the U.S. as the world’s second-biggest coal consumer by 2019; China, the world’s biggest 
producer and importer of coal, has coal demand increase by 2.6%, or 100 million tons, per year to 
2019. Id. See Rick Mitchel, IEA Says Climate Pledges Won’t Halt Global Growth in Coal Demand to 
2019, BLOOMBERG BNA ENV’T REP, Dec. 15, 2014.  
 328. Vittorio, supra note 315. 
 329. Lomborg, supra note 295. 
 330. Feifei Shen, More Idled Wind Turbines in China as Capacity Grows, BLOOMBERG BNA 
ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT, July 2015. 
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the European Investment Bank have severely limited financing for new 
coal power projects;
331
 the Dutch bank Rabobank has ceased lending to 
unconventional gas projects.
332
 “The World Bank in 2013 announced that 
it would provide money for greenfield coal-fired power stations “only in 
rare circumstances,” such as where countries have no feasible alternative 
to coal and lack financing for coal power, or where projects will 
incorporate carbon capture and storage.”333 President Obama ordered a bar 
on U.S. Export-Import Bank funding of overseas coal-fired power plants 
in developing nations unless they capture and store their carbon dioxide.
334
  
However, both developed and developing country institutions of 
government are ‘sticky.’ The Obama order on the Export-Import Bank was 
overturned in a U.S. Senate vote 64–29 in July 2015, which vote would 
bar the U.S. Export-Import Bank from denying an application for 
financing based on the source of energy used for the project.
335
 India, the 
world’s third most significant emitter of carbon, offered to make sharper 
cuts in emissions only if rich nations paid it to do so.
336
 “Richer nations 
need to provide $400 billion to $2 trillion a year to the developing world 
by 2050 to help cut greenhouse gases and fight climate change, according 
to a study by the London School of Economics.”337 This would be 4–20 
times the level pledged by developing countries by 2020, and it still has 
not been raised. 
 
 
 331. See generally John McGarrity, Update—EU Finance Arm Curbs Loans to Coal-Fired Power 
Plants, REUTERS, July 24, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/24/eu-coal-finance-idUSL6 
N0FU32R20130724; see also Alex Morales. &. Marc Roca, EBRD Scraps Most Financing for Coal 
Plants, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 10, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-10/ebrd-scraps -
most-financing-for-coal-power-plants. 
 332. Rabobankbans Loans to Shale Gas and Tar Sands, CLIMATE SPECTATOR, July 10, 2013, 
available at http://www.businessspectator.com.au/news/2013/7/10/energy-markets/rabobank-bans-
loans-shale-gas-and-tar-sands. 
 333. Murray Griffin, Australian Energy Efficiency Plan Criticizes World Bank Stance on Coal-
Fired Power, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT, Apr. 8, 2015, at 1. 
 334. Michael D. Shear, U.S. Says It Won’t Back New International Coal-Fired Power Plants, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013, available at http://Www.Nytimes.Com/2013/10/30/Us/Us-Says-It-Wont-
Back-New-International-Coal-Fired-Power-Plants.Html?_R=0.  
 335. See Dean Scott, Hurdles Seen in Reversing Overseas Coal Ban, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY 
& CLIMATE REPORT, July 28, 2015, at 1. 
 336. Uni Krishnan, India tells Developed World it will Impose more cuts in Exchange for Cash, 
Technology, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT, Mar. 26, 2015. India’s Environment 
Minister Prakash Javadekar stated that he may present the world with a choice ahead of the December 
Kyoto Protocol Conference of the Parties with the proposition that “the world has to decide what they 
want . . . Every climate action has a cost. I can’t make my poor pay for somebody who has polluted the 
world.” Uni Krishnan, India Tells Developed World It Will Impose More Cuts in Exchange for Cash, 
Technology, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT, Mar. 26, 2015, at 1.  
 337. Alex Morales, At Least $400 Billion in Climate Aid Needed for Developing Nations a Year, 
Study Says, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REPORT, Mar. 16, 2015.  
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C. The Limits of Current International Regulatory Reach 
Limiting global warming to no more than a 2º Centigrade increase from 
pre-Industrial Revolution levels will require stabilizing carbon dioxide 
concentrations in the atmosphere to no more than 450 parts per million 
(ppm).
338
 A decade ago, chief NASA climatologist James Hansen gave the 
world less than a decade to significantly slow or halt the increase of GHG 
emissions.
339
 Furthermore, Hansen suggests that even a 450 ppm limit 
would not be sufficient; he forecasts a scenario in which we will exceed 
the tipping point of runaway global warming once the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 exceeds 400 to 425 ppm.
340
 The world in 2014 
surpassed 400 ppm with levels mounting each additional year. At 450 
ppm, Hansen contends there will be no glacial or polar ice left on the 
planet.
341
  
Merely waiting until 2018 to stop the “growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions” could make it near impossible to avoid catastrophic effects of 
warming.
342
 According to Dr. John Holdren, Director of the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, if U.S. greenhouse emissions 
somehow were able to plateau in 2015, we would already have reduced 
our chances of avoiding climate catastrophes by 50%.
343
 In 2009, the 
United Nations forecast the seriousness of coming “tipping points . . . that 
will alter regional and global environmental balances . . . irreversible 
within the time span of our current civilization.”344  
However, the international legal infrastructure will not get the world 
there from current international policy. There is no provision in the Kyoto 
Protocol or its Paris 2015 COP-21 reminted agreement to ensure 
compliance of any nation that fails to achieve its reductions or violates any 
provision of the Protocol.
345
 The Protocol is voluntary and 
 
 
 338. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 68, at 242. At such modest levels, the degree 
of warming is not expected to result in radical loss of ice sheet, sea level rise, and shift of agricultural 
areas. Id. 
 339. See, e.g., James Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 9, 
available at www.nybooks.com/articles/19131.  
 340. Dean Scott, NASA Scientist Recalls 1988 Testimony by Seeking Phaseout of Coal-Fired 
Plants, 39 BNA ENV’T REP. 1273 (2008).  
 341. Id. 
 342. Robin Chase, Get Real on Global Warming Goals, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 2008, at A15. 
 343. Id. 
 344. 2009 U.N. Envt’l. Programme Y.B. 21 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.25/INF/2, at 1, available at 
http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2009. 
 345. IPCC, Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2001 (2001) available at http://www.grida. 
no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/. 
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unenforceable.
346
 This lack of international enforcement was a major 
shortcoming at the Copenhagen COP conference, and was seen by China, 
India, and other developing countries, as a major victory for their position 
supporting continuing a lack of international compliance mechanisms 
affecting them.
347
 It is of note that U.S. courts do not recognize COP 
decisions as part of U.S. law nor as precedents that must be followed by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
348
 
Even if all developed countries could achieve a Herculean reduction of 
80% of their GHG emissions by 2050, this would not achieve Kyoto 
Protocol or 2015 Paris COP-21 climate change goals without similar 
vigorous participation by developing countries.
349
 By regulating less than 
40 of the 193 world countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I 
affects only 20% of all countries, which emit much less than half of world 
carbon emissions.
350
 Less than half is not enough. 
The international infrastructure for climate change has not evolved 
significantly in the past seven years of effort. During the mid-year G8 
international summit in 2009, India and China again rejected the 
suggestion of any enforceable controls on their rapidly inflating carbon 
emissions.
351
 The Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP-15) in 
2009 tried to set an ambitious global climate change agreement for the 
post-2012 period, without success,
352
 Neither the COP-16 in 2010 in 
Cancun, Mexico, nor any subsequent COP including COP-20 in Lima, 
Peru in December 2014, nor the recent COP-21 in Paris, France, fared 
better.  
 
 
 346. The Kyoto Protocol has no compulsory mechanism to enforce any restriction or penalty 
against any signatory country that fails to achieve its carbon quota. See generally Kyoto Protocol to the 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (1998) (lacking 
enforcement mechanisms).  
 347. See generally David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate 
Governance, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. LAW & POL’Y 2, 4 (Winter 2010). 
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 349. Mohamed T. El-Ashry, An Overview of this Issue: Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate 
Change Agreement, 8 AM. U. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 2 (2008). 
 350. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33; see Green House Gas Data, 
U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_ 
unfccc/items/4146.php. 
 351. James Kirkup, G8 Summit: China and India Reject G8 Calls for Climate Targets, 
TELEGRAPH, July 8, 2009, http://i.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/g8/5780617/G8-summit-China-
and-India-reject-G8-calls-for-climate-targets.html; see also Quirin Schiermeier, G8 Leaders Fail to 
Agree on Carbon Cuts Before 2050, NATURE NEWS, July 9, 2009, http://www.nature.com/ 
news/2009/090709/full/news.2009.660.html. 
 352. Ian McGregor, Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in 
Copenhagen, GLOBAL ENV’T POL. (Feb. 2011) at 3, 4. The Copenhagen Conference only produced a 
thirteen paragraph “political accord” which was not an official product of the meeting, but only 
“noted” by the Conference because of lack of a consensus among world nations.  
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In the next five years, there will be a massive investment in 
electrification of developing nations.
353
 Once installed, those power 
facilities will remain in place, often for forty years and in many cases 
longer.
354
 According to Rajendra Pachauri, International Panel on Climate 
Change Chairman, “What we do in the next two to three years will 
determine our future.”355 The choices in energy technology made now 
certainly will be the signature of the world carbon footprint for the 
remainder of this century.
356
 
If the world is to confront this challenge, the technology is present and 
the levers of international power are accessible. Unlike fossil fuels, 
renewable resources are widely disseminated across the globe. While 
many developing nations have no significant fossil fuel reserves of oil, 
coal or natural gas, every nation has significant renewable energy in some 
form, such as hydropower, sunlight, wind, agricultural biomass waste, 
wood, or ocean wave power. Renewable energy can provide opportunities 
for poverty alleviation, supply energy, and enhance energy security by 
relying on domestic resources.
357
 Regardless of whether RPS, net metering 
or FiTs are employed, the future of international climate change will be 
measured on the degree of participation of all nations. This is now a 
challenge not of technology, but of the resilience of international law and 
administration. The levers of power must be manipulated more 
intelligently internationally to avoid the “tipping point.”  
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 355. See 2020 Climate Leadership Campaign, STATE OF THE WORLD, http://www.world 
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 356. See generally Bill McKibben, How Close to Catastrophe?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 16, 
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